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Research has found that the use of social desirability scales to measure faking is 
problematic.  The current study employed a job desirability scale consisting of job-
specific bogus biographical items as an alternative faking measure in an applied setting.  
Using a 2 (applicants versus incumbents) x 2 (sales versus managers) design, participants 
(N = 958), participants completed a set of personality, social desirability, and job 
desirability measures.  Results indicated that applicants outscored incumbents on 
personality measures. However, the effect size for conscientiousness was larger for the 
manager job whereas the effect size for extraversion was larger for the sales job, 
indicating a job-specific pattern of faking.  Furthermore, applicants faked most on bogus 
items that were specific to the job they were applying for (sales vs. manager).  Applicants 
who faked on the job desirability scale also systematically increased their chances of 
being hired over non-fakers.  Job desirability scores displayed weak to moderate 
correlations with personality, social desirability, and job experience, although these varied 
somewhat by job type.  The results have various implications for: non-cognitive test usage 
in selection settings, assumptions regarding incumbent test scores, the unique challenge of 
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Various research findings in the last two decades support the claim that personality 
tests add predictive utility for personnel selection.  Large scale meta-analytic reviews by 
Barrick, Mount, and Judge (2001) and Hurtz and Donovan (2000) have concluded that 
measures of conscientiousness and neuroticism were significantly correlated with job 
performance measures across various occupation types.  They also found that other Big 
Five personality factors, such as extraversion and agreeableness significantly predicted 
performance in specific job settings, such as sales and team jobs.  This confirmed findings 
from earlier meta-analyses which reported that personality tests were predictive of job 
performance for various job types (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hough 1992; Salgado, 1997; 
Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991).  Similar findings have been reported for other non-
cognitive measures, such as integrity tests (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993), biodata 
(Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Reilly & Chao, 1982) and customer service measures (Frei & 
McDaniel, 1998).   
 Despite these advantages, much concern has been raised about the susceptibility of non-
cognitive tests to faking, or response distortion.  Numerous studies have established that 
such tests can be faked easily by respondents (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & 
McCloy, 1990; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999; Zickar & Robie, 1999).  Most of the studies 
documenting this susceptibility to faking, however, were laboratory studies employing 




 faking is not prevalent in actual applicant settings (Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007), 
evidence of intentional response distortion in applied selection situations does exist 
(Griffith, Chemielowski, and Yoshita, 2007; Anderson, Warner, & Spencer, 1984).  This 
debate has been and continues to be a source of much conflict in the faking literature and 
it will only be resolved through the continued use of actual applicant samples in faking 
research.  
 These conflicting findings also have led to a debate over the effects of faking on 
the construct validity of personality tests.  While some studies indicate that faking does 
not alter the factor structure of personality tests (Bradley & Hauenstein, 2004; Robie, 
Zickar, and Schmit, 2001) other research indicates that faking does detrimentally alter 
factor structure (Van Iddekinge, Raymark, Eidson, & Putka, 2003, Weekley, Ployhart, & 
Harold, 2003).   
Ultimately, however, faking is not a concern to practitioners if it does not reduce 
the predictive, or criterion, validity of personality measures in predicting job performance.  
This issue has been an even larger source of debate.  Ones, Viswesvaran and Reiss (1996) 
performed a meta-analysis which found that controlling for social desirability did not 
improve validity of personality measures overall.  Other research also has concluded that 
corrections for social desirability have no effect on criterion validity (Christiansen, 
Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Hough 1998).  In addition, some studies comparing 
applicant to incumbent samples have found very similar criterion validity estimates 
regardless of sample type, suggesting that although applicants may inflate their scores on 
personality measures, it does result in lower validity in predicting their job performance 




On the opposing side of this dispute, however, there are researchers who report 
that faking does reduce criterion-related validity in selection (Harold, McFarland, & 
Weekley, 2003; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998).  Due to the widespread use of 
personality testing in actual selection settings today, this matter has important 
implications.  If personality tests cannot predict job performance when applicants fake on 
them, personality testing may result in a loss of valuable time and money. 
 These conflicting results may be due largely to the way in which faking is 
conceptualized by different researchers.  Traditionally, faking has usually been 
operationally defined as social desirability (Hough et al., 1990; Barrick & Mount, 1996). 
This has led researchers to use measures of social desirability to identify respondents who 
fake on personality tests and then statistically correct personality scores for social 
desirability.  However, social desirability is a response bias toward giving an overall good 
social impression (Furnham, 1986), which, is not entirely deceitful or conscious (Paulhus, 
1984).  Since intentional deception is precisely the type of faking that practitioners are 
most concerned about, however, social desirability scales may not be an appropriate 
measure of faking (Kluger & Colella, 1993; Pannone, 1984).  Moreover, recent findings 
indicate that job applicants tend to fake in a manner which is complex and highly specific 
to the job they are applying for (Birkeland, Manson, Kissamore, & Brannick, 2006; 
Raymark, Shilobod, & Steffensmeier, 2004), which is inconsistent with the nature of 
social desirability (Furnham, 1986) thus prompting the search for new constructs to model 
this job-specific faking and appropriate measures to detect it (Carroll, Jones, & Sulsky, 




Clearly, additional research is necessary in order to resolve the issues surrounding: 
1) the actual prevalence of faking in applied settings, 2) the extent to which faking 
attenuates construct and criterion validity, and 3) which conceptualizations and measures 
of faking will be most effective in identifying fakers.  The current study seeks to address 





II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Faking has been given many different names in the literature.  It has been referred 
to as response distortion, dissimulation, impression management, claiming unlikely 
virtues, lying, inflation bias, and self-enhancement (Anderson et al., 1984; Edwards, 1957; 
Hough et al., 1990; Hough & Paulin, 1994; Lautenschlager, 1994; Paulhus, 1984).  
Extensive research has been conducted on faking, yet the exact nature of faking and its 
effects on personality tests remains unclear.  Thus far, some of the most pivotal questions 
that have been addressed in faking research are:  1) is faking possible?    2) Can faking be 
reduced or eliminated?  3) Is faking prevalent in applied settings?  4) Does faking lower 
the construct and criterion validity of personality measures?  5) Is faking equivalent to 
social desirability, and if it is not, 6) are there more effective methods of detecting fakers 
than social desirability measures?   
Currently, however, three of these issues are at the center of debate in the field:  
the prevalence of faking in applied settings, whether faking affects criterion validity, and 
whether social desirability measures effectively measure faking.  The current literature 
review will address all of these topics and argue that faking is prevalent in the applied 
world, it adversely affects criterion validity, and it is not adequately measured by social 
desirability.  Instead, a more recent alternative measure of faking, job desirability, is 
proposed as a more effective measure of faking and is argued to be specifically designed 




Faking is Possible 
 The ability of subjects to fake on personality tests has been documented 
consistently over years of research.  Early studies, such as Meehl and Hathaway’s (1946) 
study on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) K-Factor, have found 
that subjects can present themselves in a manner that significantly influences their scores.  
Subjects portrayed themselves in too favorable a light or tended to be overly honest and 
self-critical.  These tendencies were described by the authors as deliberate and conscious 
efforts to fake.  As Meehl and Hathaway (1946) noted, however, various earlier studies 
had warned about the possibility of faking and its detrimental effects on personality 
measures (Allport, 1928; Bernreuter, 1933; Kelly, Miles, & Terman, 1936; Vernon, 
1934).  The fakability of personality tests has become increasingly apparent, as studies by 
Borislow (1958), Dicken (1959), and Orpen (1971) showed that subjects could present 
themselves deliberately in a more favorable light for certain purposes on Edwards' (1959) 
Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS).  Strengthening the findings was the fact that this 
test was designed specifically to reduce socially desirable responding (Hogan, 1991). 
 Additional studies have continued to examine the susceptibility of personality tests 
to faking.  A study by Hinrichsen (1972) used college students as subjects and divided 
them into two groups; one was instructed to answer honestly whereas the other was told to 
fake in the direction of a successful top manager on the Gordon Personality Inventory 
(GPI).  Results indicated that those told to fake scored significantly higher than those in 
the honest condition.  A similar study instructed college undergraduates to either "answer 
honestly", "fake good", or "fake bad" on the FIRO-B and found the test could be faked 




Dunnette, Koun, and Barber (1981) concluded that the Eysenck Personality Inventory also 
was fakable under instructions to fake good (make a good impression) or to fake bad 
(make a poor impression).  Further evidence came from a study involving personnel in 
various military settings, which found that respondents successfully distorted their self-
descriptions in both a favorable and unfavorable manner when instructed to do so (Hough 
et al., 1990).   
Meta-analysis studies have provided evidence on a larger scale that respondents 
can distort their scores substantially.  Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) provided meta-
analytic findings which reported that respondents could change their scores by over 0.50 
standard deviations on several Big Five personality inventories and integrity tests.  Alliger 
& Dwight (2000) also reported that personality and integrity test scores could be increased 
by subjects upon instructions to fake good or upon being coached on how to fake.  
Subjects increased their integrity test scores by as much as 1.32 standard deviations and 
increased their personality test scores by as much as 0.38 standard deviations.  In yet 
another meta-analysis, which examined data from 25 studies of the MMPI, researchers 
concluded that subjects with symptoms of psychopathology could underreport (fake) their 
scores by as much as one standard deviation on the average (Baer, Wetter, & Berry, 
1992).  Thus the evidence strongly suggests that people can easily fake personality tests 
when instructed to do so.  
Can Faking Be Reduced or Eliminated?   Previous Findings 
 
Attempts to make non-cognitive measures less susceptible to faking have a long 
history in industrial and organizational psychology, however, this history is beyond the 




used to deter faking, along with some novel alternative approaches which seem promising 
thus far. 
One method which has been accepted for some time as an effective means to deter 
faking is simply warning applicants not to fake (e.g., Hough, 1998).  A review by Dwight 
and Donovan (2003) highlights that although some studies have shown that warnings do 
reduce faking, other studies suggest that warnings have negligible effects.  The authors 
reviewed the extant research and identified 15 studies on faking and warnings, 10 of 
which had adequate information necessary for estimating effect sizes.  They found a 
sample-weighted mean effect size of 0.23 standard deviations, which they classified as a 
“weak” effect.   
Dwight and Donovan (2003) went on to discuss a possible reason for the 
inconsistency in results – information conveyed in the warning.  Warnings tend to either 
convey that 1) those who fake can be identified, 2) what the negative consequences of 
faking on the test will be, or 3) both of these messages simultaneously.  Upon analyzing 
the effect that this information factor had on the same studies, they concluded that it had a 
substantial effect; the average effect size for studies only warning about identification was 
nearly zero (0.01 standard deviations) whereas the average effect size for studies warning 
about the consequences of faking was 0.30.  Combining these two information pieces 
resulted in an average effect size of 0.25.  Although only 10 studies were included in the 
review, results indicate that information conveyed in a warning not to fake is important.   
A subsequent laboratory study by the authors tested the effect of these types of 
information in a warning not fake.  Results indicated that all three types of warnings 




However, only the warning that included both identification and consequences 
information produced scores that were significantly lower than scores in the no-warning 
group.  Harold, McFarland, Dudley, and Odin (2004) used a warning which conveyed 
both these pieces of information.  It also resulted in significantly lower personality and 
social desirability scores for those who were warned than for those not warned.  Thus 
there is evidence that warnings may effectively deter faking if they convey that faking can 
be detected and that this will result in negative consequences, such as an applicant being 
removed from the applicant pool.   
 Another proactive technique used to reduce applicant faking is the construction of  
ipsative measures of personality.  Ipsative measures have existed for many years and were 
specifically designed to control socially desirable responding, or the tendency to give 
overly positive self-descriptions (this topic will be discussed in further detail in a later 
section).  An ipsative measure presents respondents with response options that are equal 
in social desirability, thus their choice should not be influenced by social desirability.  
Respondents must choose only one option that is the “most true” of them and choose one 
which is the “least true” of them in their everyday behavior.  A major underlying 
assumption is that when respondents are forced to choose among a group of equally 
positive options (usually four), the option that is actually most true of them will be 
perceived as the best choice in describing themselves (Bowen, Martin, and Hunt, 2002).   
Research has found that, in fact, ipsative measures are more resistant to faking 
than normative measures (Bowen et al., 2002).  However, major psychometric differences 
exist between ipsative and normative measures, which has led to a preference for 




that in ipsative formats, the sum of all scales comprising the total test adds to a constant, 
such that every respondent receives the same score on the total test.  This limits any 
elevation of scores on the total measure; only the subscales can differ in total score.  It is 
this psychometric requirement which makes a measure truly ipsative.  Such a scoring 
system, in effect, limits the investigator to intra-individual differences only, whereby a 
person’s relative strengths and weaknesses on a given construct can be compared.  It 
precludes any inter-individual comparisons, however.  Normative and ipsative measures 
also differ in many other aspects, such as item structure, presentation, questionnaire 
instruction, answering, and statistical assumptions.  Together, these differences have 
resulted in the infrequent use of ipsative measures in North American I/O psychology, 
although the same is not true of Asia and most of Europe (Bowen et al., 2002). 
 Other personality measurement techniques which capitalize upon a forced-choice 
format have been proposed.  An example is James’ (1998; 1999) Conditional Reasoning 
Test (CRT), which was developed as an alternative to self-report measures of personality.  
Although it also features a forced-choice format, it differs from ipsative measures in many 
key elements, including its theory.  The Conditional Reasoning approach measures 
personality indirectly by measuring how a person perceives a particular situation.  It is 
assumed that people have different latent motives which lead them to view, or frame, the 
world differently and that certain situations make these latent motives highly salient.  The 
way a person frames their world leads them to construct an idiosyncratic logical reasoning 
in order to explain their behavior.  This reasoning can be considered “conditional” 
because it relies heavily upon a person’s latent motives.  Therefore, the Conditional 




logical reasoning when they solve problems.  The CRT thus appears to be a problem-
solving test to the test taker, who does not realize that what is actually being measured is 
their personality (James, 1998; 1999; 2000). 
 It is precisely this design aspect which makes the CRT more resistant to faking.  
LeBreton, Burgess, and James (2000) found that participants under instructions to fake 
good were significantly less able to fake the CRT than a more transparent measure of 
personality.  Hence, measuring personality in a more indirect fashion seems to reduce 
faking.  
 Using a similar model of indirect measurement, Leasher, Miller, April, Gildea, 
Rees, Schwartz, and Tristan (2004) developed a “scenario-based” test format in which 
participants were presented with a scenario which is intended to activate latent motives.  
Participants then select among certain alternatives in response to the scenarios.  Each 
alternative represents a possible reaction to the scenario.  When instructed to fake for a 
hypothetical job which they wanted, this scenario-based measure of conscientiousness, 
along with the IPIP Conscientiousness scale, the authors found that the scenario based 
measure was substantially less fakable than the IPIP.  It appeared that participants were 
unable to decipher which responses to the situations would increase their scores and give 
them the best chance to be hired. 
Although biodata items are qualitatively different from personality items, research 
indicates that they are nonetheless fakable as well (Lautenschlager, 1994).  However, 
research indicates that the more verifiable a response to a biodata question is, the less 
likely it is to be faked (Becker & Colquitt, 1992; Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003). For 




shown some promise in deterring response distortion on biodata measures.  Item 
elaboration requires respondents to elaborate on their answers to biodata questions.  For 
example, if an item asked the respondent how many times he or she led class discussion 
during their senior year of high school, after endorsing one of the available frequency 
response options, the respondent would then be asked to list the classes and discussion 
topics that they actually led. This example was taken from a study by Schmitt, Oswald, 
Kim, Gillespie, Ramsay, and Yoo (2003), who replicated Schmitt and Kunce’s (2002) 
earlier finding that subjects score significantly lower on biodata measures when they are 
required to elaborate on their responses.  Thus, the requirement of elaborating upon one’s 
experiences on biodata measures appears to deter faking on this type of non-cognitive 
measure.  This is in agreement with other findings (Lautenschlager, 1994). 
Faking is Prevalent 
 
Although the evidence clearly shows that faking is possible, it is still strongly 
debated whether applicants in actual selection settings actually engage in faking to any 
significant extent.  Unfortunately, findings regarding the actual prevalence of faking have 
been contradictory.  Abrahams, Neumann, & Githens (1971) found no significant 
differences in test scores when comparing administrations of the Strong Vocational 
Interest Blank (SVIB) under laboratory versus actual selection conditions, indicating that 
in actual selection conditions, applicants did not fake the SVIB.  A similar study by Orpen 
(1971) compared students' change of scores on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule 
(EPPS) with those of actual applicants for a clerical position.  Both students and selection 
applicants responded under two conditions - as either part of a selection procedure or 




from the first administration to the second, the job applicants' scores were similar in both 
conditions, indicating little tendency of applicants to fake on the EPPS in an actual 
selection setting.   
Schwab and Packard (1973) found similar results in a study using the Guilford 
Personality Inventory (GPI) and Guilford Personality Profile (GPP).  No significant mean 
score differences were found between a group who was told that results would be used as 
part of the selection process and a second group that was hired then asked to complete the 
tests for unrelated research purposes only.  Such low prevalence of faking has been 
documented also by Becker and Colquitt (1992) who found that actual selection 
applicants faked biodata items to a much lesser degree than did incumbents instructed to 
fake.  Applicant responses were more similar to those of incumbents told to answer 
honestly.  Ryan and Sackett (1987) also reported no significant differences between 
honest and simulated applicant respondents on a pre-employment honesty measure.  
Hough et al.’s (1990) study involving military subjects found that the personality test 
scores of newly sworn-in military personnel who took the test as a means for making 
decisions about their future military careers were very similar to the scores of incumbents.  
Therefore, the authors concluded that faking on personality tests has a low prevalence 
rate.  Thus, there is strong evidence indicating that faking is not prevalent in applied 
settings, and is therefore not a cause for concern. 
Despite such strong evidence to the contrary, however, many studies have found 
that faking in actual selection settings is highly prevalent.  Early research on faking has 
provided support for this argument.  Green (1951) reported that applicants for police 




selected.  In a study on fakability of emotional stability measures, Heron (1956) observed 
that applicants for a bus conductor position faked a self-report inventory in a selection 
situation but did not fake when they were tested again in a post-selection situation for 
research purposes only.  Bass (1957) investigated the faking behavior of sales applicants 
on a forced-choice personality instrument and found that applicants scored significantly 
higher on three of four personality sub-scales than did incumbents.  Elliot (1976) 
concluded that bank and industrial managers from Britain and Ireland significantly faked 
the 16PF questionnaire during a selection situation.  
Further evidence of faking in a job applicant setting was provided by Pannone 
(1984), who found that over one-third of applicants faked a questionnaire of job-relevant 
skills.  Results similar to Pannone's (1984) were found in another experiment where 
nearly one-half of the applicants also faked on a job-relevant skills questionnaire 
(Anderson et al., 1984).  Griffith, Chmielowski, Snell, Frei and McDaniel (2000) found 
55% of applicants at a temporary employment agency had scored at least one-half a 
standard deviation higher on a measure of conscientiousness when they took the test in an 
actual selection situation compared to when they took the test under an “honest” condition 
anonymously one month later for research purposes only.  More importantly, the authors 
reported significant rank-order changes in applicants’ test scores as a function of testing 
situation, which indicates that faking can increase an applicant’s chances of being hired.  
The literature has documented additional evidence of response distortion in applied 
settings (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Costello, Schneider, and Schoenfeld, 1993; Elliot, 1981; 




Rosse et al. (1998) conducted a field study that compared personality scores of 
actual job applicants on the NEO-PI-R to scores of job incumbents.  It was found that job 
applicants scored significantly higher than job incumbents on all Big Five personality 
factor scores and on a measure of intentional response distortion.  Thus it was concluded 
that applicants applying for actual jobs do in fact fake on personality tests.  Similar 
evidence was presented by Robie, Zickar, and Schmit (2001), who compared 2 large field 
samples of sales manager applicants (N = 999) and sales manager incumbents (N = 769) 
from a large retail organization and found that the personality scale scores of applicants 
were approximately half a standard deviation higher than the scores of incumbents.  More 
recently, a meta-analysis by Birkeland et al. (2006) compared applicant and incumbent 
scores on Big Five measures which were gathered from nearly 30 applied studies.  The 
authors reported that applicants significantly outscored incumbents on all five of the 
personality factors.  Four of these five effect sizes were statistically significant, with sizes 
ranging from .11 to .45 standard deviations.  Other studies have also compared applicant 
and incumbent personality scores and found that applicants score significantly higher than 
incumbents (Hough, 1998b; Stewart, 1997; Van Iddekinge, Raymark, Eidson, & Putka, 
2003; Weekley, Ployhart, & Harold, 2003). 
An underlying weakness in many of the studies cited above, including those by 
Birkeland et al. (2006) and Robie et al. (2001), however, is that they used between-
subjects designs to examine differences between applicants and incumbents.    This design 
is plagued by the fact that although numerous differences (most notably motivation to 
fake) exist between job applicants and incumbents (Guion & Cranny, 1982), the between-




designs cannot utilize random assignment to the applicant and incumbent group and they 
assume no subject by instruction interaction (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998).  For these 
reasons, within-subject designs are seen as a better design for studying faking 
(Lautenschlager, 1986). Although faking-based field studies using within-subjects designs 
are uncommon in the literature, some recent studies provide valuable findings using this 
type of design. 
One such example is the recent study conducted by Ellingson, Sackett & Connelly 
(2007), who examined a database of over 700 individuals who had completed the 
California Psychological Inventory (CPI) twice through an assessment firm as part of 
either an application or development process.  Their unique database consisted of 
individuals who had tested 1) once as applicants and once as incumbents, 2) both times as 
applicants, or 3) both times as incumbents for development purposes.  This allowed them 
not only assess extent of faking by comparing Time 1 and Time 2 scores, but also to 
isolate the extent to which changes in scores were attributable to intentional distortion by 
accounting for the effects of time between administrations, feedback received on one’s 
assessment, and practice effects.  Their results indicated that the average change in scores 
which could be attributed to actual faking was minimal – only .07 standard deviations.  
The authors concluded that in applied settings, individuals do not engage in any 
substantial faking, and that it has very little if any effect on hiring decisions.  It should be 
noted however, that in this study, the authors did not assess whether there were any 
changes in the rank-order of applicants across test administrations.  Thus, a portion of the 
individuals may have scored significantly higher in the selection setting than the 




Due to the fact that the authors only examined average changes in test scores across the 
full sample, however, this important outcome would not be observed or noted. 
In a similar vein, Hogan et al. (2007) examined a dataset of 5,266 applicants who 
took a personality assessment in order to apply for a customer service position.  They 
were all rejected and then re-applied six months later for the same position by completing 
the same assessment.  By comparing mean scores on the two administrations, the authors 
were able to measure faking in a selection setting using a repeated measures design.  
Results indicated that only 5% of applicants raised their score on any scale during the 
second administration.  Moreover, an equal percentage of applicants received lower scores 
on the second administration.  They found that only 3 of the applicants increased their 
scores on all scales beyond a 95 percent confidence threshold, thus concluding that 
“faking on personality measures is not a significant problem in real-world selection 
settings.”  Nonetheless, an important drawback of this study is that it was based entirely 
on a sample of applicants who failed the employment test the first time and as a result, 
were rejected for a position.  In essence, the study only included individuals who had low 
propensity or ability to fake, thereby systematically removing the very applicants who 
would be most likely to fake and increase their score the most in order to increase their 
chance of being hired.  Had the study included individuals who were successful in passing 
their first employment test, and then completed the test for development or research 
purposes, the results may have been much different. 
In contrast to these findings, Griffith, Chemielowski, and Yoshita (2007) reported 
evidence of faking in a field setting using a repeated-measures design.  Applicants for a 




process.  One month later, they were mailed the same measure (N = 60) and were asked to 
complete it voluntarily under an honest condition.  Participants scored significantly higher 
as applicants than they did under the honest condition.  More importantly, they also found 
that the rank order of applicants was altered across these two test conditions such that the 
individuals who scored highest under the selection condition were not the same ones who 
scored highest under the research condition (Griffith et al., 2007).  Given that 
organizations typically use fairly stringent selection ratios (Cascio, 1998) in order to hire 
the best possible applicants, the results of this study suggest that the company would have 
hired more customer service applicants who faked because these individuals tended to 
have the highest scores under selection condition. 
A promising new study by Donovan, Dwight, and Hurtz (2003) assessed the 
prevalence of faking in applied settings without relying on any between- or within-subject 
comparisons.  Using the randomized-response technique, which guarantees anonymity of 
all responses made by participants, the authors were able to obtain an estimate of the base 
rate of faking by actual entry-level job applicants.  Subjects, who had all recently applied 
for various entry-level positions, were asked whether they had engaged in various faking 
behaviors, such as exaggerating one’s work experience or overemphasizing one’s positive 
attributes.  Results revealed that a substantial portion of applicants reported engaging in 
various faking behaviors.  The average prevalence rate of faking behaviors was 29%, but 
for some behaviors, it was as high as 77%.  Nine of the 29 behaviors had a prevalence rate 
greater than 40% and 4 of the behaviors had a rate greater than 50%. The behavior with 
the greatest prevalence rate (76.7%) was “I exaggerated less than 10% of the information 




exaggerated about 75% or more of the information I provided” and “I claimed to have 
more education than I actually did.”  Other behaviors which are highly relevant to 
selection scenarios were:  “I exaggerated my work experience to make myself look more 
impressive than I really am” (44.7%) and “I gave responses on a test that were 
completely false or made-up.” 
Moreover, since 75% of applicants reported that they felt the response technique 
truly guaranteed their anonymity and 68% indicated that the experimenters had no way of 
knowing which applicants admitted to faking, the authors concluded that the prevalence 
rates obtained from the applicants were reasonably accurate and representative of faking 
behavior in actual applicant situations.  Most important, however, was that the prevalence 
rate of faking as measured by the randomized-response technique was over twice as high 
as the prevalence of faking which was obtained using a traditional questionnaire format, 
showcasing the power of this method to elicit more candid responses from respondents. 
These findings suggest that the aforementioned between-subjects studies may in fact be 
accurate in their reports that actual applicants do fake. 
Although the debate over the prevalence of faking in actual selection settings 
continues to the present day, recent findings increasingly support the conclusion that 
faking is prevalent in applied settings and is therefore a critical issue to practitioners.  
However, this issue remains to be settled completely and it will only be resolved through 
continued faking research in actual selection settings.  The best estimate of the prevalence 
of faking by applicants can only be gained by studying actual applicant behavior.  Hence 
it is crucial for investigators to obtain data from actual organizations rather than from 




Effects of Faking on Construct Validity 
 Most of the research concerning faking and construct validity has been based on 
the Five-Factor Model of personality (Borgatta, 1964; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Norman, 
1961; Tupes & Christal, 1961).  This model postulates that an individual’s personality can 
be categorized generally into five broad personality factors.  These factors are: 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to 
Experience.  These factors, particularly Conscientiousness, have been found to predict job 
performance and training proficiency in applied settings (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; 
Barrick & Mount, 1991).   
If faking does not affect construct validity, one would predict that the factor 
structure of personality tests administered to fakers should closely resemble the factor 
structure of tests administered to honest respondents.  Hence, when the Five Factor Model 
is used, five factors should emerge when conducting a factor analysis for both faking and 
honest groups.  However, a large body of evidence suggests that this is not actually the 
case. 
  Some of this evidence comes from laboratory studies where subjects were 
instructed to fake.  One such study reported that when responses from subjects instructed 
to fake were compared with responses from subjects in an honest condition, exploratory 
factor analysis revealed that the two conditions had different factor structures and 
multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) matrices (Douglas et al., 1996).  Frei, Griffith, Snell, 
McDaniel, and Douglas (1997) examined differences on a biodata scale between faking 
and honest groups using LISREL and found that the groups had a different number of 




study using a sample of ARMY personnel who were instructed to take the Assessment of 
Background and Life Experiences (ABLE; Hough et al., 1990) under both honest and 
faking instruction conditions, Ellingson, Sackett & Hough (1999) reported that in the 
faking condition, the factor structure of the ABLE was completely reduced to just one 
overall factor.  Similar results using a factor structure other than the Big Five taxonomy 
have been reported as well (Holden & Jackson, 1981; Michaelis & Eysenck, 1971). 
There appears to be a difference in factor structure of personality measures 
between applicant and student samples as well.  Schmit and Ryan (1993), comparing the 
NEO-FFI responses of college undergraduates to those of a job applicant sample, found 
that the Five Factor model fit the responses of the student sample but did not fit the 
applicant responses.  This discrepancy between the factor structure of the two samples 
was attributed to a sixth factor which emerged for the applicant sample only.  Upon 
inspection, the factor had loadings on the conscientiousness, agreeableness and 
extraversion subscales, which led the authors to identify it as an “ideal employee factor.”  
Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, and Klawsky (1996) supported these findings by observing 
that a six factor solution fit NEO-PI responses from a sample of flight attendant trainees 
better than a five factor solution.  Although in this study the data did not support the 
interpretation of this sixth factor specifically as an “ideal employee factor”, Cellar et al.'s 
(1996) results supports the finding that the factor structure for applicant personality 
measures differs from that of laboratory subjects.  
Most compelling from an applied standpoint, however, is the finding that the 
personality factor structure of actual applicant data significantly differs from that of job 




between customer service manager incumbents and applicants at a large retail 
organization.  Weekley et al. (2003) also compared the factor structure of applicant 
responses to the structure of incumbent responses and found that, although the factor form 
was similar, the magnitude of the factor loadings significantly differed across the two 
groups.  Even when partial invariance was tested, the fit of the statistical model was still 
poor, indicating that faking has detrimental effects on the construct validity of personality 
inventories.  Thus faking can alter the factor structure of personality tests in laboratory 
settings and there is evidence that it may do the same in applied samples.  
 Some research findings, however, have indicated that faking does not significantly 
alter the construct validity or psychometric properties of personality inventories.   Robie 
et al. (2001) analyzed data from 999 sales manager applicants and 796 sales manager 
incumbents at a large retail organization using Differential Item Functioning (DIF) 
analysis and found that although applicants tended to score higher on average, there were 
no psychometric measurement differences between the two groups.  In other words, the 
items measured the same constructs regardless of whether they were administered to 
applicants or incumbents. This led the authors to conclude that applicant and incumbent 
personality scores do not differ in any practically significant manner.  When Smith, 
Hanges, and Dickson (2001) compared the personality structure of responses from job 
applicants, job incumbents, and college undergraduates, the results indicated that the five-
factor model of personality significantly fit each sample of data.  This provided strong 
evidence that the factor structure of applicant personality test data is not significantly 
different from that of incumbents or students, suggesting that any effects of faking present 




individuals' personality scores into an honest response group and a faking group based on 
a social desirability scale (scores that were high on the social desirability scale were 
classified as faking scores) and found that the factor structure for both groups was highly 
similar.  Therefore, they concluded that faking did not alter the factor structure of 
personality measures.   
 A meta-analysis by Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss (1996) confirmed similar findings 
regarding factor structure.  Their results indicated that convergent validities, obtained by 
correlating each of the Big Five factor scores with the scores for same factor (e.g., 
Extraversion scores from one study with Extraversion scores from another study) across 
various studies and measures, remained stable after social desirability was partialed out of 
the correlations.  Decreases in convergent validity coefficients only ranged from zero to 
.05, suggesting that faking has minimal, if any, effects on convergent validity of 
personality measures.  The authors reported the similar findings for the discriminant 
validity coefficients, which should be low in order to demonstrate that each personality 
factor is unique and different from the other factors.  Again, this was the case even after 
social desirability scores were partialled out of the correlations (Ones et al., 1996).  
Moreover, in the study cited earlier by Hogan et al. (2007), the authors reported that the 
factor structure of the Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI), which is a Big Five-based 
personality measure, did not change across Time 1 and Time 2 administrations, which 
were both in an applicant setting.  
Together, these studies do present a case that perhaps faking does not attenuate the 
construct validity of personality measures.  Such findings are in direct opposition to those 




validity are.  Some have attributed the difference in findings to poor methods of statistical 
analysis, such as failure to account for multivariate normality in applied data sets, or the 
use of inappropriate fit indices in factor analysis, however, a review of the literature by 
Bradley and Hauenstein (2004) suggested that it is not likely that such methodological 
differences are the cause of the divergent findings.  The authors state that other 
unidentified substantive factors are likely to be the cause of such differences across 
studies. 
Although Bradley and Hauenstein (2004) fail to suggest why the findings from 
these studies are contradictory, it is my belief that a key factor is the way in which faking 
is conceptualized and measured.  Two of the aforementioned studies (one being a meta-
analysis of several studies) which found that faking did not alter construct validity used 
social desirability measures to classify respondents as fakers (Ellingson et al., 2001; Ones 
et al., 1996).  This essentially equates faking with social desirability.  Therefore, the 
findings from these two studies do not necessarily indicate that faking has no effect on 
construct validity; they simply indicate that social desirability has no effect, because that 
is how they operationalized faking.  However, the crux of this proposed research is that it 
is problematic to equate faking with social desirability, and that research that uses social 
desirability measures cannot justify conclusions concerning faking.  I will discuss this in 
greater detail in a later section of this review.  Moreover, these studies only deal with 
construct validity.  Even if faking has little effect on construct validity, faking could still 
have deleterious effects on criterion validity, which is of much greater importance to 
practitioners.  Hence the main concern in faking research should be to assess the effects 




Effects of Faking on Criterion Validity – Faking Does Not Lower Validity 
The effect of faking on criterion-related validity is complex and has been the subject 
of serious debate by researchers in the field.  This complexity is due in part to conflicting 
findings on whether faking actually attenuates criterion validity.  One body of research 
findings suggests that faking has little or no effect on the criterion-related validity of 
personality measures.  Weekley et al. (2003) analyzed a sample of 2,989 job incumbents 
and 7,259 job applicants and found that although applicants had higher mean scores on 
three personality measures, criterion-related validities were equivalent across both 
samples, suggesting that any faking which may have occurred did not attenuate validity.  
Hough et al. (1990) reviewed criterion-related validities reported in studies from 1960 to 
1984 and found that validity coefficients remained stable regardless of whether 
respondents engaged in “faking good” or “faking bad” response patterns. 
Subsequent research in this area has also found that corrections for faking do not 
improve criterion validity. Christiansen et al. (1994) obtained measures on the 16PF from 
495 assessment center applicants and compared them to subsequent performance 
measures.  Correcting applicants’ scores for the two 16PF faking scales did not 
significantly improve criterion-related validity.  Hough (1998) evaluated two strategies for 
dealing with applicant faking on a personality measure.  One involved correcting 
applicants’ scores on a social desirability measure while the second consisted of removing 
applicants with extremely high scores on the social desirability measure from the 
applicant pool.  Neither strategy was found to affect criterion-related validity.  Barrick and 
Mount's (1996) research supports this claim as well.  They tested the effects of impression 




predictive validity of the Big Five personality factors.  Although subjects did engage in 
both of these types of response distortion, neither type lowered the predictive validities of 
the personality constructs.  Furthermore, evidence from a recent simulation study 
concluded that under typical selection conditions, removing suspected fakers from an 
applicant pool has minimal effects on test validity (less than .10 standard deviations 
increase in mean performance ratings).  The study also reported that there was even less 
impact on test validity when scores were statistically corrected for faking (Schmitt & 
Oswald, 2006).  The authors noted, however, that although faking corrections or faker 
removal had minimal impacts on validity at an aggregate level, these procedures could 
have significant impact on selection decisions at the individual level. 
Likewise meta-analytic studies finding that faking does not decrease predictive 
validity of personality or integrity tests have led some to claim that the data has "nailed 
the coffin of faking and social desirability shut" (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1996, p. 266).  
Their findings were based on the fact that partialing out social desirability from 
personality scores did not significantly improve validity coefficients across studies.  The 
authors’ remarks emphasize that these research findings are convincing enough to 
conclude that social desirability and faking, in general, are not a threat to personality test 
validity, and the field should move on to other issues (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Ones 
& Viswesvaran, 1996).  Hogan et al. (2007) voiced a similar opinion based on their recent 
findings that applicants do not significantly increase their personality tests scores when re-
applying for a job.  However, this study did not examine faking effects on validity. I 
would like to note that in all of these studies, with the exception of Weekley et al. (2003) 




surrogates for faking and then statistically controlled for or partialled out of the predictor 
– criterion relationship.  If social desirability does not fully capture faking behavior, 
however, such corrections could not be expected to improve criterion validity, and in this 
case, they did not. 
Effects of Faking on Criterion Validity – Faking Does Lower Validity 
On the opposing side of this debate are those who have demonstrated that faking 
does indeed lower criterion validity.  Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, and Thornton (2003) 
conducted a study in which participants completed the AMI-S, an achievement motivation 
measure, in either a control condition or an incentive condition, after which they also 
completed a 50-item performance task that consisted primarily of matching tasks, finding 
discrepancies, and simple problem-solving tasks, such as addition and pattern recognition 
tasks.  In order to simulate an actual selection setting, participants in the incentive 
condition were informed that the investigators were interested in “people who are hard 
working, motivated, and conscientious” and that the test they were about to take measured 
these characteristics.  They also were informed that only those who scored highest in these 
characteristics would be selected for the second half of the study, in which they would be 
eligible to win a cash prize of $20.  Lastly, they were instructed to be honest in their 
responses because falsification could disqualify them.  In contrast, subjects who were in 
the control condition were only instructed to be as honest as possible in their responses, 
and that their answers would be used only for research purposes and thus were completely 
anonymous.  Results indicated that the validity of the AMI-S was lower for the incentive 




in correlation coefficients was not statistically significant, it does indicate that faking can 
actually lower validity coefficients. 
 Harold, McFarland, and Weekley (2003) investigated the effects of verifiability on 
the validity of biodata items in both an applicant and an incumbent sample.  While 
verifiable biodata items were equally valid across both groups, this was not the case for 
non-verifiable biodata items.  For these items, validity was significantly lower in the 
applicant sample than in the incumbent sample.  The authors concluded that this 
difference was due to applicants faking on the non-verifiable items but not on verifiable 
items.  Since applicants are more likely to distort their responses on items that cannot be 
verified, these items would be faked to a greater extent than items that could be verified, 
and applicants would have the motivation to do so.  However, it was surmised that 
incumbents would have less motivation to fake and therefore, they responded similarly to 
both verifiable and non-verifiable items. 
Komar, Brown, Komar & Robie (2008) conducted a simulation study that 
extended the aforementioned simulation by Schmitt & Oswald (2006).  Rather than 
simply examine the effects of corrections on validity, they investigated how various 
parameters of faking would affect criterion validity.  In contrast to Schmitt & Oswald’s 
(2006) conclusions, Komar et al. (2008) found that under certain conditions, faking can 
substantially reduce a test’s criterion validity.   Critical variables such as the correlation 
between faking and performance, the proportion of fakers in the sample, and the 
magnitude of faking all exerted strong effects upon criterion validity.  The faking-
performance relationship had the strongest effect, potentially causing as much as a 74% 




authors also conducted utility analyses and indicated that on average, faking on an 
assessment would cost an organization over $520 per applicant, and in extreme cases, 
faking would cost an organization over $2400.  Such findings clearly indicate that 
applicant faking can be very costly to any hiring organization, especially under high 
volume hiring conditions or when hiring highly paid candidates. 
Dunnette, McCartney, Carlson, & Kirchner (1962) conducted one of the early 
studies on this issue and reported that criterion-related validity of personality scores for 
sales representative applicants who were instructed to fake was lower than for applicants 
instructed to respond honestly.  Anderson et al. (1984) investigated the relationship 
between faking and clerical performance to assess effects on criterion-related validity.  In 
fact, measures of faking had a significant negative correlation with performance on an 
external clerical task.  Similarly, Pannone (1984) included a non-existent (fictitious) but 
seemingly job-related task on a biographical job questionnaire.  Applicants who indicated 
prior experience performing such a task performed significantly worse on a written test of 
job knowledge.  Moreover, when this group of fakers was removed from the analysis and 
validity coefficients were recomputed, validity coefficients increased from .42 to .55. 
Similar results were found in a study which involved college students with previous 
work experience (Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 1996).  Subjects' scores on a personality 
test and a biodata measure were correlated with previous supervisors' performance ratings.  
The results indicated that validities for those told to fake were much lower than for those 
told to respond honestly.  Moreover, the study cited earlier by Cellar et al. (1996) lends 
partial support to this study as well.  A full length version of the NEO-PI personality 




flight attendant trainees.  When validation of the two measures was attempted by 
comparing them to subsequent training success, the NEO-PI predicted success but the 
much more transparent adjective scale did not.  Although no actual measure of faking was 
administered, it is possible to speculate that subjects distorted responses more on the 
adjective scale due to its high transparency (which is conducive to faking) and in turn, this 
led to poorer criterion-related validity in comparison with the NEO-PI, which has more 
subtle items.  Subtle items do not make it clear to respondents what personality constructs 
are being measured, thus making them harder to fake.   
Additional research has found similar results.  Holden & Jackson (1981) found that the 
criterion validity of the Personality Research Form was lower when subjects were 
instructed to fake good or fake bad as opposed to when they were instructed to reply 
honestly.  Topping & O’Gorman (1997) compared subjects’ responses on the NEO-FFI to 
personality ratings (on the same instrument) from judges who knew the subjects 
personally for at least 12 months and used the correlation between self and judge ratings 
as a measure of predictive validity of the NEO-FFI.   Subjects were assigned to either an 
honest or a “fake good” condition.  It was found that for 4 of the 5 Big Five factors 
measured by the NEO-FFI, validity was significantly lower for the faking group in 
comparison to the honest group.  Along a similar vein, Worthington and Schlottmann 
(1986) found that the validity coefficients of two MMPI subscales in predicting a measure 
of nonconformity were only significant in an honest condition; they were not significant 
in a “fake good” or “fake bad” condition.  In conclusion, there is a large body of evidence 





Problems With Validity Coefficients as Indicators of Faking Effects 
Thus, in regards to criterion validity, the aforementioned research findings suggest 
that faking often lowers criterion validity, but not consistently.  As discussed, some 
studies have found that faking does not significantly lower the criterion validity of non-
cognitive measures (e.g., Ones et al., 1996).  However, relying strictly upon attenuation of 
the validity coefficient for a whole applicant sample as an indicator of the effects of 
faking on validity may be misleading.  Rosse et al. (1998) have pointed out several 
methodological reasons for why validity is not always affected even when faking does 
occur.  First, the authors note that correlation coefficients are extremely robust in 
estimating a linear relationship between variables but this robustness results in a very low 
sensitivity to changes in rank order of particular ranges of a bivariate distribution.  
Therefore, when faking occurs, the rank order of applicant test scores may change at the 
top of the distribution but not in the remainder of the distribution, thus altering who is 
selected at the top of the distribution without lowering the magnitude of the test’s validity 
for the whole sample (this issue will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
section).   
Second, applicant scores on faking measures tend to be negatively skewed (moderate 
to high levels of impression management), causing range restriction in the predictor.  This 
makes it difficult to detect relationships between faking and other variables.  Third, low 
selection ratios compound the problem posed by a negative skew, resulting in further 
range restriction.  Since low selection ratios are desirable and typical in actual 
organizational settings, this is a common problem in applied data sets.  Finally, the 




validity coefficients are low to moderate in magnitude, which is almost exclusively the 
case for personality measures in organizational settings.  It is possible that these 
methodological factors prevented some researchers from detecting a detrimental effect of 
faking on criterion validity in their data sets (e.g., Hough et al., 1990; Weekley et al., 
2003).  Thus, it is important to look beyond just the correlation coefficient when assessing 
whether or not faking decays criterion validity. 
In addition to the methodological factors that may obscure the effect that faking has 
on the validity of non-cognitive measures, the failure to account for variance due to 
individual differences in faking may also be the cause of so many discrepant findings in 
this area.  Lautenschlager (1986) addressed this issue by stating that if all applicants fake 
to the same extent, then faking does not change rank orders of applicants and therefore 
criterion validity should be unaffected.  However, if there are individual differences in the 
extent to which applicants fake, then faking can affect criterion validity.  Research 
findings support the notion that such individual differences do exist.  For example, 
individuals who are low in integrity, low in conscientiousness, and high in neuroticism 
tend to fake to a greater extent on personality, biodata, and integrity tests.  In addition, 
these differences tend to be stable across the three test types (McFarland & Ryan, 2000).  
Similarly, Griffith, English, Yoshita, Gujar, Monnot, Malm, and Graseck (2004) found 
that individual differences in integrity and locus of control are also related to applicant 
faking behavior.   
Hence it seems unwise to assume that all individuals fake to the same extent and in the 
same fashion.  Instead, research suggests that applicants differ in these behaviors, making 




measure.  If this is the case, conclusions from studies that partial out faking or social 
desirability from personality test scores may be erroneous.  Partialing out the 
contamination of faking incorrectly assumes that there is no variance on the faking itself 
(Bowen et al., 2002) despite the aforementioned evidence that there is substantial variance 
in faking (Griffith et al., 2004; McFarland & Ryan, 2000).  This methodological practice 
could be the reason that several studies fail to find decay in validity coefficients when 
faking is controlled statistically.  However, this only holds true for the studies which used 
this methodology (e.g., Barrick and Mount, 1996; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1996).  It would 
not apply to studies concluding similar findings based simply on comparisons of applicant 
and incumbent samples without an actual measure of faking (e.g., Weekley et al., 2003). 
 In addition to the failure to account for individual differences in faking, a 
methodological flaw in studies that partial out social desirability is the underlying 
assumption that faking equals social desirability.  In the context of this literature review, 
this methodological flaw is the most important and will be thoroughly discussed in an 
upcoming section.  Just as I discussed in the earlier section on construct validity, the same 
theoretical dilemma affects criterion validity analyses.  Simply put, if a researcher 
statistically partials out social desirability from the predictor – performance relationship 
and this fails to increase the correlation coefficient, it does not necessarily imply that 
faking does not affect validity.  It simply implies that social desirability does not affect 
criterion validity.  Unfortunately, the majority of existing applied faking studies have 
made the former assumption.  Nonetheless, I propose that until there is fairly conclusive 
evidence that social desirability alone can account for all of the variance in faking 




To summarize on the issue of whether correlation coefficients are sensitive to 
faking, the existing applied studies reviewed here generally have used one of two 
strategies to test this hypothesis:  1) assessing whether the criterion validity of applicants’ 
scores is lower than the validity of job incumbents’ scores, and 2) testing whether 
criterion validity is improved after statistically controlling for social desirability.  Both 
strategies are subject to methodological constraints which could preclude researchers from 
detecting the effects of faking on criterion validity.  In the case of straight comparisons 
between applicants and incumbents, the methodological issues outlined by Rosse et al. 
(1998), such as insensitivity of correlations to rank-order changes and range restriction, 
present the problem.  As for the studies using statistical control for social desirability, 
these studies suffer from not only from some of the issues outlined by Rosse et al. (1998), 
but also from the assumption that social desirability is an adequate measure of faking and 
from the failure to account for individual differences in faking.  For these reasons, 
researchers using these methodologies may have prematurely suggested that faking does 
not attenuate the predictive utility of non-cognitive measures.  Hence, it is necessary to 
look beyond these approaches and instead investigate whether faking adversely affects 
final hiring decisions, rather than only assessing its effect on validity coefficients.  One 
such approach is discussed in the following section. 
Fakers “Rise to the Top” Regardless of Stable Validities 
One way to assess the impact of faking on hiring decisions is to examine whether 
applicants who fake are the same applicants who tend to be hired.  Despite the fact that 
validity coefficients may remain intact when applicants fake on non-cognitive measures, 




because they raise their test scores inordinately over the scores of non-fakers.  Although 
this does not guarantee that a person who is low on a trait will outscore a person who is 
naturally high on that given trait, this process does become a problem in the upper 
portions of the score distribution.  Those who score in the highest percentiles because they 
are naturally high on a trait cannot score any higher due to the nature of the measure being 
used.  Therefore, this range restriction causes a “ceiling effect” on their scores, which 
prevents these non-fakers from increasing their scores, thereby allowing fakers (who 
would have scored much lower if they had answered honestly) to significantly increase 
their scores to the top portions of the score distribution and “catch up” with non-fakers.  
This is how faking actually leads to rank-order changes in non-cognitive test scores 
(Lautenschlager, 1986; Nunnally, 1978).  This process, in turn, adversely affects potential 
hiring decisions in a top-down selection process where an organization hires applicants 
with the highest scores on a given non-cognitive test score.   
Using a sample of actual job applicants for various entry-level positions at a ski resort, 
Rosse et al. (1998) found that with selection ratios of 25% or lower, the average level or 
faking for applicants hired was at least one standard deviation above the mean.  At a 
selection ratio of 5%, faking scores were nearly two standard deviations above the mean.  
In more practical terms, if only the top 5% of applicants are hired, 7 of the 8 people hired 
would have extremely high scores on a faking measure.  Similarly, if the top 10% are 
hired, over half of the new hires would have extremely high faking scores. 
Previous research using computer simulations has led to the same conclusions about 
the effects of faking on the rank-ordering of job applicants.  For example, Zickar, Rosse, 




simulated applicant faking on non-cognitive measures.  Both studies demonstrated that 
even with relatively few fakers in a sample, the top end of the distribution can contain a 
high percentage of fakers.  In Zickar et al.'s (1996) study, faking had a noticeable effect on 
who would be hired although it had no effect on predictive validity.  For example, Zickar 
et al. (1996) concluded that if ten percent of the subjects fake, five to six of the top ten 
subjects will most likely be fakers.  It should be noted that in selection settings, these top 
ten subjects would most likely be selected for the job of interest.  Moreover, in the 
Douglas et al. (1996) study, the validity coefficient calculated for the entire sample was 
.20 whereas the validity was near zero if calculated only for those with the top ten scores.  
In the Ones et al. (1996) study, validity coefficients were based on the entire sample of 
applicants, not just the ones who were hired or selected.  If the Ones et al. (1996) meta-
analysis had calculated validities based only on those selected (at the top of the 
distribution), validity coefficients may have been dramatically lower (Miller, 2000).   
It is possible to argue that the results of the Douglas et al. (1996) study described 
above were attributable to range restriction in the predictor scores, whereby validity 
coefficients based only on the top scores were highly attenuated.  However, the Mueller-
Hanson et al. (2003) study cited earlier provides the same findings in a manner which 
circumvents this issue.  As previously stated, one group was in an honest response 
condition while the other group was in an incentive condition.  When the incentive group 
was divided into top and low thirds based on AMI-S (measure of achievement motivation) 
scores, validity was significantly higher for the lower third (r = .45, p < .05) than for the 
top third (r = .07, ns).  However, this was not the case in the control group, as there was 




compared.  Thus the authors suggested that in the applicant condition, fakers were able to 
rise to the top of the distribution, changing the rank-order of the upper distribution and 
thus decaying the validity of the predictor for only these applicants.  The lower part of the 
distribution, in contrast, did not consist of many fakers, thus the validity of the predictor 
for applicants in this score range was maintained.  As for subjects in the honest condition, 
there was no difference in validity between upper and lower thirds of the score range 
because there was no inherent motive to fake.  Due to the fact that the study compared 
validities for the upper and lower thirds of the score range (as opposed the comparing the 
upper and full ranges), the difference in validities are not necessarily attributable to range 
restriction effects, as in the case of the Douglas et al. (1996) study.  
Even more striking, however, is the finding by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) that as 
the selection ratio decreases (e.g., as an organization becomes more selective) the 
percentage of fakers selected disproportionately increases.  In fact at selection ratios of 
.50, .25, .20, .15, and .10, which most adequately represent actual selection practice, the 
number of honest respondents that were selected was significantly and consistently lower 
than the percentage of honest respondents in the full sample.  This was not the case for 
selection ratios of .60, .70, .80, or .90, however, indicating that fakers indeed rise to the 
top of the distribution and greatly improve their chances of being selected on the basis of 
a non-cognitive test score. 
Additional research has documented the same effect.  Hough (1998) also found that 
fakers rose to the top when she administered a personality inventory and a social 
desirability measure to a sample of actual police applicants and incumbents.  Any police 




were classified as fakers.  When results were analyzed and the top 10% of the applicant 
scores were selected, only 18% of the total applicant sample consisted of fakers.  
However, 46% of the selected applicants were fakers.  A similar study which simulated a 
selection setting for safety force personnel positions found even more striking results – 
participants who received coaching on how to fake a conscientiousness, or were instructed 
to fake on it, made up 100% of the top 10% of those selected based on this test.  Of those 
who were instructed to respond honestly, none were selected based on a top-down 
selection situation where the top 10% were hired.  Such a hiring ratio is very typical of 
selection for these types of positions (Miller & Barrett, 2008).  
Thus it is clear that faking does lower the predictive validity of personality measures 
because it affects who is selected at the final stage of the selection process, regardless of 
what the validity coefficient of the whole sample is.  Researchers could possibly calculate 
validity coefficients based only on those applicants who are selected in order to better 
assess the effects of faking on validity of personality measures.  However, this would 
introduce range restriction, which would give an artificially low estimate of validity.  
Nevertheless, such research could still lead to valuable findings in this area of selection. 
Taken together, the findings from these studies highlight why it is essential to look 
beyond simple correlation coefficients and instead examine actual hiring decision 
processes when studying how faking affects validity.  In fact, some researchers have 
already suggested that criterion validity may not be a good indicator of a selection 
measure’s utility because it is insensitive to deleterious effects of faking (Douglas et 
al.,1996; Rosse et al., 1998; Zickar, et al., 1996).  On the other hand, some researchers 




of how well a predictor functions and it has guided the science of industrial and personnel 
psychology research for decades (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998).  Moreover, criterion 
validity is the most feasible validation strategy for non-cognitive measures.  In fact, these 
researchers go so far as to state that shifting the focus away from criterion validity when 
evaluating the predictive utility of a test is “equivalent to shifting into a clinical approach 
in personnel selection.” (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998, p. 256).  Hence the call to look 
beyond criterion validity in faking and selection research is not without its critics, but in 
my opinion, it is a valuable and necessary suggestion in the field of applicant faking 
research because it leads to alternative methods (such as examining whether fakers rise to 
the top) which unveil how faking compromises the validity of actual selection situations 
whereas relying on validity coefficients would not consistently reveal these important 
effects. 
Faking is Not Equivalent to Social Desirability – Theory 
In order to further examine why faking does not consistently lower validity, it is 
crucial to consider the way in which we conceptualize and operationalize faking behavior.  
These findings may be largely due to the fact that most of the earlier research on faking 
defined and measured faking as social desirability.  Examples of these measures are well-
known validity, or lie, scales such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI) F and K Scales, the CPI Good Impression Scale, and the 16PF Faking Good and 
Faking Bad Scales.  Such scales are designed to identify this particular type of response 
distortion, social desirability, because the theory underlying their construction equates 
faking with social desirability.  However, various researchers do not believe social 




healthy personality (e.g., Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1983).  
These researchers argue that removing social desirability from personality test responses 
decreases their validity.   
As I have previously stated, this presents a problem in that if social desirability does 
not constitute faking, then these types of faking measures may be ineffective in detecting 
faking.  In fact, this is precisely the case.  Various researchers have discussed and shown 
that faking is much more than just social desirability and brought forth evidence that 
traditional social desirability scales are not necessarily the most effective measures of 
faking. 
Social desirability refers to the general tendency to distort self-reports in an overall 
favorable direction (Furnham, 1986).  A similar definition of social desirability, proposed 
earlier by Edwards (1957, p.32), conveys the same general meaning.  He described it as "a 
tendency to attribute to oneself personality statements with socially desirable values and 
to reject those with socially undesirable values."  Stated differently by others, social 
desirability refers to a need to obtain approval by responding in a culturally appropriate 
and acceptable manner (Marlowe & Crowne, 1961).  Hence, the social desirability 
construct can be defined best in terms of people's attempts to make a general, all-
encompassing good impression in self-reports without intentionally creating any specific 
or unique impression.  This is one of two major characteristics of social desirability. 
The second aspect of the social desirability construct deals with intention, which gives 
it a two-factor structure.  It has been shown that social desirability can actually be divided 
into 1) self-deception and 2) impression management (Paulhus, 1984; 1991b).  Self-




form overly positive beliefs about one’s self-concept.  Thus, this factor actually represents 
a true dimension of a person’s personality and should be treated as true variance in 
personality.  It has been shown to correlate highly with facets of adjustment, such as self-
esteem, depression, and neuroticism (Paulhus, 1991b).  Thus the self-deception factor in 
social desirability is unconscious and unintentional.   
The second factor in social desirability, impression management, is different in this 
regard because it refers to the conscious, deliberate falsification or distortion of one’s true 
personality in order to create a positive impression.  This factor does not represent true 
variance in a person’s personality and thus introduces error variance.  The key aspect of 
this distinction that is relevant to the present review is that the self-deception is 
unintentional response distortion whereas impression management is intentional response 
distortion.  Whenever response distortion is intentional and deliberate, such as in the case 
of impression management, the term “faking” applies.  This is one of the major 
differences between social desirability and faking.  Since only one part, or type, of social 
desirability is intentional – impression management, then only this type should be 
considered faking.   
As stated previously, however, impression management is a faking strategy that 
attempts to create positive, but general, impression.  It does not lead to any specific type 
of impression, but attempts to make the respondent “look good” on all dimensions of a 
measure.  Therefore impression management represents only one way to fake; it is not the 
only way in which a person can engage in deliberate response distortion.  It is my belief 
that the inconsistencies in the literature regarding the effects of faking on construct and, 




assumption that faking is equivalent to either:  1) the whole social desirability construct, 
or 2) the impression management factor in social desirability.  Faking is not entirely 
equivalent to either of these because it is deliberate and it can involve creating a specific 
impression, not just an overall, general impression.  Therefore, controlling statistically 
only for social desirability measures, or components of social desirability measures will 
not completely control for faking because it may not capture all of the ways in which 
people can distort their response.  This could explain why in the Ones et al. (1996) meta-
analysis, it was found that faking did not attenuate validity.  This finding could be due in 
part to the fact that there was no distinction made between the two qualitatively distinct 
dimensions of social desirability – impression management and self-deception.  This is an 
important distinction because, as stated earlier, it distinguishes between intentional and 
unintentional response distortion.    
Faking is Not Equivalent to Social Desirability – Research Findings 
Although the majority of past research on faking has measured the construct with 
social desirability measures (e.g., Hough et al., 1990; Ones et al., 1996), a growing body 
of evidence suggests that these two constructs are not the same thing.  One initial problem 
is that different social desirability scales, which purport to measure the same construct, do 
not tend to correlate highly with each other, which demonstrates low convergent validity 
(Paulhus, 1991b).  This suggests that the construct of social desirability itself needs to be 
more narrowly defined.  Another issue, described earlier, is that social desirability scales 
have been found to correlate highly with personality traits such as adjustment, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and integrity (Ones et al, 1996; Zerbe & Paulhus, 




in social desirability and personality, it still indicates it is problematic to use the whole 
social desirability construct as a surrogate for faking because it is partly related to true 
personality variance. 
Some research even indicates that social desirability is not a strong predictor of 
faking, which ultimately defeats the purpose of using social desirability scales to measure 
faking.  Griffith et al. (2004) reported that neither the self-deception nor the impression 
management subscales of the BIDR, a popular social desirability measure, significantly 
predicted faking on the NEO-FFI.  Faking in this study was defined as scoring above the 
upper bound of a 95% confidence interval established around a subject’s score in an 
honest response condition.  This condition followed an initial faking condition in which 
all subjects first were led to believe they were applying for an actual clerical position 
which paid $18 per hour.  Hence, self-deception and impression management, which have 
been traditionally associated with faking and have been used to detect faking so often, 
may not be strongly associated with faking behavior after all. 
Despite the findings from this line of research, many studies continue to 
conceptualize faking simply as social desirability, and measure it only with social 
desirability scales.  Upon finding that social desirability does not affect psychometric 
properties of the scales to any significant extent, these studies then infer that faking has no 
effect on personality measures either.  However, if one takes into account the 
aforementioned problems of low convergent validity, shared variance with true 
personality, and weak relationships with faking behavior, it can be argued that the reason 
these studies have found no effects of faking is because perhaps they were not properly 




Two previous studies serve as a useful example to this argument..  In both studies, 
faking was measured with social desirability scales.  A closer look at these studies 
illustrates why the use of social desirability scales to measure faking may have failed to 
fully capture faking behavior and led to the erroneous conclusion that faking had effect on 
personality scores.  In one study, Ellingson et al., (2001) categorized individuals' 
personality scores into an honest response group and a faking group based on a social 
desirability scale (scores that were high on the social desirability scale were classified as 
faking scores) and found that the factor structure for both groups was the same.  
Therefore, they concluded that faking did not alter the factor structure of personality 
measures.  In another study, the "Big Five" factor structure was imposed on three different 
sets of scores on the HPI obtained from students, job applicants, and job incumbents.  
Results indicated that the number of factors underlying the HPI scales did not change 
across all three sets of scores (Smith et al., 2001).   
One important aspect of both the Ellingson et al., (2001) and the Smith, Hanges, 
and Dickson (2001) studies is that neither investigated factor structures within each type 
of job.  The majority of the subjects used in the two studies were actual job applicants 
who were applying for a wide variety of jobs.  However, both studies collapsed subjects 
across all job categories, so that the type of job being applied for was not accounted for in 
the analyses.  This would allow fakers to simply fake on items that seemed to be relevant 
to the job they were applying for, instead of faking on all possible items.  If this were the 
case, it would be difficult to detect faking because only a portion of the total items would 
be faked (those relevant to the job).  An earlier study by Ellingson et al., (1999) further 




complete the ABLE first under an honest condition, then under conditions to respond in a 
way which would ensure that the Army selected them (i.e., in an overall, socially 
desirable way).  They found that correcting each individual’s ABLE score in the faking-
condition for social desirability resulted in scores that were very different from their 
honest ABLE scores.  In other words, the factor structure of the ABLE dissolved into one 
overall social desirability factor.  In addition, they found that corrected faking scores on 
the ABLE had very low construct validity due to their low correlations with the honest 
scores.  Because this study instructed subjects to fake in an overall, socially desirable 
manner, subjects most likely faked on all possible items, thereby eroding the factor 
structure that the test was designed to measure.  Thus it would be much easier to detect 
such extensive mean score differences across the honest and faking conditions under these 
circumstances, whereas in the prior two studies (Ellingson et al., 2001, and Smith, 
Hanges, & Dickson, 2001) faking may have been very subtle and difficult to detect 
because subjects had a specific job in mind when they applied.  This would allow them to 
fake on far fewer items without being detected by the social desirability measures because 
social desirability measures are not designed to detect such specific faking. Moreover, 
some researchers cite anecdotal reports of actual applicants suggesting that social 
desirability scales themselves may be susceptible to faking because applicants fear that 
their responses might not be believable if they appear to make themselves look “too 
perfect” (Barrett, 2001). 
Research using methodology based on Item Response Theory (IRT; Drasgow & 
Hulin, 1990) further weakens the argument that social desirability can capture applicant 




subscales of the 16PF personality questionnaire functioned differently across applicant 
and non-applicant samples to a substantial degree, suggesting that applicants did in fact 
fake on the 16PF.  Interestingly, the impression management scale used in the study to 
measure faking exhibited differences in item functioning as well, which is tantamount to 
applicants faking the faking scale, as suggested by Miller & Barrett (2001).  Therefore, 
the same impression management scale measured different constructs, depending on 
whether it was used on an applicant or a non-applicant sample. Stark et al. (2001) 
concluded that studies classifying individuals as honest or faking respondents on the basis 
of social desirability scales (e.g., Ellingson et al., 2001) are therefore problematic.  The 
problem is that these studies classify applicants as either fakers or honest respondents 
based on how highly they score on social desirability scales.  However, the social 
desirability scales may not be sensitive enough to detect faking because faking is more 
than just social desirability.     
A Better Description of Applicant Faking – Job Desirability 
It follows that if faking is not comprised solely of social desirability, perhaps 
another form of response distortion accounts for the variance in faking.  Ones et al. (1996) 
alluded to this notion when they mentioned the possibility of a response distortion bias 
toward the specific applicant situation.  Kluger and Colella (1993) referred to this as "job-
specific bias" or "job desirability."  They defined this as the tendency for individuals to 
present themselves as having characteristics deemed desirable for the specific job for 
which they are applying for.  Job desirability is different than social desirability in the 




chance at being selected for a specific job, whereas they would not necessarily present 
themselves in a socially desirable way. 
To further illustrate the difference between job desirability and social desirability, 
an example of job desirability would be that of an applicant for a law enforcement 
position who falsely responds that he is highly aggressive and dominant because he feels 
these qualities are necessary for being a good police officer.  Even though he might feel as 
though these traits might be seen as socially undesirable in an everyday sense, he would 
sacrifice giving the socially desirable response (being low on aggression and dominance) 
in order to give the response which will give him the best chance to be hired (being high 
on both of these traits) because he believes that these traits are desirable in a law 
enforcement officer. 
Conversely, an example of social desirability1 would be that of a law enforcement 
applicant who falsely responds that he is low on aggression and dominance because he 
feels that these qualities are not socially desirable in an everyday sense.  If he responded 
in a socially desirable manner on all personality items, this applicant would attempt to 
score very highly on any traits which society deems desirable, while scoring very low on 
any traits which society deems undesirable - regardless of whether the job he is applying 
for requires that trait.  Socially desirable responding is thus general in the sense that it is 
directed at every personality trait which the person can distinguish on the test they take.  
In contrast, job desirable responding would not necessarily be reflected on every 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that in this particular example, when I use the term “social desirability,” I am referring 
solely to the impression management factor of social desirability because this represents intentional 
response distortion.  I have used the more general term “social desirability” in this instance because the 
extant literature usually uses this broader term to describe deliberate faking, even though it may refer to the 
whole construct or just the impression management factor.  More importantly it focuses the reader’s 





personality trait; people would only fake on traits deemed relevant for the job they are 
applying for. 
Given that job desirable responding would result in responses which are specific to 
a certain job, it implies that applicants would respond differently for different jobs.  In  
fact, many studies have documented this specific finding.  Wesman (1952) found that the 
same individuals gave different profiles when they were instructed to answer as if 
applying for a sales position versus when applying for a librarian position. Stanley and 
Stokes (1999) found that subjects provided very different personality profiles when given 
different job descriptions and then asked to fake applying for the positions of Air Force 
officer, graphic artist, and marketing executive.  Mahar, Cologon and Duck (1995) 
reported that subjects who were told to give the best general impression themselves 
responded quite differently than those told to present themselves as suitable for a 
psychiatric nurse position. Similar results were found by Kluger, Reilly, and Russell 
(1991), who found that subjects who were given information about a specific target job 
biased their responses according to the job specifications, resulting in different scores than 
those who did not receive any information about the target job.  And in yet another study, 
Velicer and Weiner (1975) reported that the same subject gave different responses when 
instructed to either respond honestly, to portray an ideal self, or respond as if applying for 
library or sales positions. 
The Measurement of Job Desirability 
Although the concept of job desirability as a form of faking is relatively new in the 
literature, a body of work is beginning to accumulate which has described and measured 




used are “inflation bias” (Anderson et al., 1984) and “job-relevant pattern faking” 
(Raymark, Shilobod, & Steffensmeier, 2004).  Using various methods, these studies have 
consistently found that job applicants often fake their responses in a manner which is very 
specific and tailored to the job for which they are applying, indicating that social 
desirability may only measure one aspect of faking whereas job desirability captures a 
different aspect. 
Anderson et al. (1984) found evidence for a job-specific response bias when they 
asked job applicants for a clerical position to answer a questionnaire which contained 
embedded bogus tasks which superficially resembled job-relevant tasks but were in fact 
non-existent.  An example item is "I have experience matrixing solvency files," which 
indicates faking if the respondent replies that he or she has done this task in the past.  
Surprisingly, nearly one-half of the applicants faked at least one of these items by 
claiming they had experience performing such non-existent tasks (Anderson et al., 1984).  
Pannone's (1984) study was very similar in that he found that over one-third of applicants 
for an electrician position claimed they knew how to operate a piece of non-existent 
equipment on a questionnaire testing job-related knowledge.   
 Using a similar “bogus-item” approach, Carroll, Jones, and Sulsky (2004) 
developed a test containing bogus items about popular culture which was used in a 
simulated application setting to select a candidate for an “Events Coordinator” at a college 
campus.  The test contained 75 names, 25 of which were fictitious, and participants were 
instructed to rate their familiarity with each name.  One group of participants was 
informed that the ideal job candidate for this position would have knowledge of popular 




told that the candidate who scored highest on this questionnaire would win a cash prize.  
A second group in a control condition also completed the questionnaire but was not 
informed about the job description or the cash prize, but simply was instructed to respond 
as honestly as possible.  Results indicated that the bogus item test displayed adequate 
construct validity as a measure of faking as evidenced by significant correlations with 
measures of impression management and self-reported admission to faking and non-
significant correlations with a self-deception measure.  More importantly, the test was 
successful at identifying fakers; subjects in the incentive condition scored significantly 
higher on the bogus item test than subjects in the control condition. 
 Raymark et al. (2004) adopted a different and more complex strategy in order to 
detect job desirable faking.  Using only facets from the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 
1992) personality inventory, they reviewed a vast number of specific personality facets 
(subcomponents of the larger “factors) and theoretically linked them to personality 
requirements of several jobs which had very distinct job descriptions.  This effort resulted 
in a set of six different jobs which required candidates who possessed substantively 
different patterns of the Big Five personality factors to be successful at each job.  It was 
ensured that each job had an optimal personality profile in which at least one of the 
personality-performance relations was in the opposite direction as would be found in a 
socially desirable response set (the previous example of a law enforcement applicant 
responding high on “aggression” illustrates this point; the job desirable response for this 
job would be “highly aggressive” whereas the socially desirable response would be “not 
aggressive”).  Raymark et al. (2004) reported that faking was very context-specific in that 




importantly, subjects raised their scores on some facets but lowered their scores on other 
facets even if, theoretically, the socially desirable response would have been to have a 
high score on that particular facet.   
  Similar results were reported earlier by Mudgett (2000), who experimentally 
manipulated the type of job that participants were instructed to fake for.  He found that the 
desirability of different personality traits varied for different jobs.  Moreover, results 
findings indicated that participants did not respond to the personality measures in a 
uniformly socially desirable manner, but in a manner which was desirable for the target 
job.  This involved changes in magnitude (e.g., endorsing an item as “very frequently” 
rather than “frequently”) and direction (e.g., endorsing an item as “frequently” rather than 
“sometimes”) of faking according to job type.  Both these studies provide excellent 
examples of a situation in which using a social desirability measure to detect applicant 
faking would be inadequate because of the complex relationship between faking and the 
type of job in question.  Whether social desirability or job desirability measures are more 
effective in detecting fakers is the topic of the next section. 
Job Desirability Measures:  More Sensitive to Faking than Social Desirability Measures 
Although the Raymark et al. (2004) and the Mudgett (2000) study cited above did 
suggest that job desirability may offer a more effective approach to detecting fakers than 
social desirability, these studies did not directly test this hypothesis.  In fact, very little 
research has specifically examined whether some type of job desirability measure would 
be more sensitive to faking than a social desirability measure.  One previous study 
(Kluger & Colella, 1993) sought to answer this particular question, albeit using a biodata 




for a nurse's assistant position.  Faking was operationalized as responses to items on the 
biodata measure that were on extreme ends of a Likert-type scale.  Measures of both 
social desirability and job desirability were included. Using hierarchical regression, job 
desirability had an incremental effect above and beyond social desirability in predicting 
the extreme responses, whereas social desirability did not have an incremental effect 
above and beyond job desirability.  The authors concluded that job desirability was a 
better predictor of faking biases than social desirability. 
Subsequent research in this area also has found that job desirability measures 
detect faking more effectively.  To investigate this issue, Miller and Tristan (2002) 
conducted a study where a sample of 599 undergraduate students underwent one trial in 
which they completed the NEO-FFI personality inventory under instructions to answer in 
a manner that would give them the best possible chance of being hired for a law 
enforcement position.  In a later trial, they completed the same measure under instructions 
to answer as honestly as possible.  Faking was operationalized as the difference in NEO-
FFI conscientiousness scores in the first trial minus their scores in the second trial.  
Subjects completed social desirability and job desirability measures in each trial.  Results 
indicated that although the social desirability measures were related to standardized mean 
differences (Cohen's D) ranging from 0.05 to 1.63 standard deviations, the job desirability 
measure was much more sensitive to faking, resulting in a Cohen's D of 2.63 standard 
deviations.  Thus, a higher Cohen's D, or effect size, in score differences between faking 
and honest conditions was found for job desirability scores than for social desirability 




led to the same finding, indicating that job desirability measures are more sensitive to 
faking than social desirability measures. 
Nonetheless, some findings indicate that social desirability measures are quite 
sensitive to faking on personality tests.  Viswesvaran and Ones’s (1999) meta-analysis on 
the fakability estimates of personality measures found that, on average, social desirability 
scales had higher mean score differences between honest and faking conditions than any 
of the Big Five factor scales as evidenced by the highest effect sizes between test 
conditions.  This was the case regardless of whether the studies used a between- or within-
subjects design.  The authors concluded from this review that social desirability scales are 
very useful in the detection of faking.  However, it should be noted that in this study, the 
sensitivity of social desirability measures to faking was only compared to that of Big Five 
personality scales, which are not specifically suited for the detection of faking.  Had a 
comparison been made against another type of faking measure, such as a job desirability 
scale, results would have probably been different.     
Although the aforementioned findings certainly suggest that job desirable 
responding more accurately captures how an applicant may fake a test, it does not 
necessarily imply that applicants do not engage in any socially desirable response bias at 
all.  It is certainly feasible that some combination of these two types of faking may occur 
as a person attempts to convey an optimal impression to an employer.  Moreover, the 
studies which compared effect sizes of the two types of tests across faking and honest 
conditions (Kluger & Colella, 1993; Miller & Tristan, 2002) revealed that although job 




social desirability measures were also faked consistently.  Thus, at least some degree of 
socially desirable responding does seem to go on as well.   
In fact, some research supports this argument, implying that applicants may utilize 
both job and social desirability strategies when they fake on personality tests, depending 
on how relevant the personality items appear to be for the target job.  Burkrant (2001) 
conducted a study that examined subjects’ profiles on personality items that were relevant 
to a target job and on items that were irrelevant to the target job that they were instructed 
to fake for.  It was hypothesized that if applying for a journalist position, for example, 
subjects would fake being more agreeable, extraverted, and less conscientious than if 
applying for a Certified Public Assistant (CPA) position, which instead would lead to 
subjects faking higher conscientiousness, and less agreeableness, and extraversion.  
Results revealed an interesting pattern; for items that measured job-relevant traits, 
subjects faked in a job-desirable manner, which was consistent with the hypotheses.  
However, for items that were irrelevant to the target job, subjects tended to answer in a 
socially desirable manner instead, as evidenced by high scores on all possible traits – not 
only the ones relevant to the job.   
If Burkrant’s (2001) findings are applied to previous research, this would imply 
that in the Ellingson et al., (1999) Army study, subjects would have faked on social 
desirability because there was no specific target job.  Hence, subjects most likely faked on 
all possible items, which altered the factor structure of the personality tests extensively. 
Such sizeable factor structure changes in the personality measure would be easy to detect.  
But, in the Ellingson et al., (2001) and Smith, Hanges, and Dickson (2001) studies, 




jobs.  This job desirability faking strategy would result in changes that were much more 
subtle, thus the social desirability measures used in those studies to detect the faking was 
not sensitive enough to detect these subtle changes in the psychometric properties of the 
personality measures that were used.   
Above all of the problems discussed earlier on this matter, it is this lack of 
measurement sensitivity (to faking) which most prompts me to propose the use of job 
desirability measures, rather than social desirability measures, to identify applicant faking 
on non-cognitive measures.  There is ample evidence at this point to conclude that 
applicants can fake in ways which are not entirely captured by the social desirability 
construct.  Job desirability has been found to successfully identify fakers and it is more 
sensitive to faking than social desirability.  Therefore, the use of social desirability scales 
alone as a means for identifying fakers seems unwarranted.  Job desirability measures can 
tap into subtle and job-specific faking variance in ways which social desirability measures 
simply cannot.   
Aside from the research body supporting it, this argument is rational in a 
theoretical sense because each applicant is different and each job description is different, 
thus faking behavior depends on the job and the applicant.  A measure of general social 
desirability or impression management, which would be the same regardless of the job, 
would be unable to measure important aspects of each unique selection situation.  In 
contrast, a job desirability measure will always be specifically developed to be highly job 
specific.  I believe that this is the reason why so much of the research on the effects of 
faking and validity is not more conclusive.  If more studies had measured faking with a 




more consistently as a consequence of this type of faking.  Then, such findings would 
concur with the evidence from studies investigating the “rise to the top” effect (e.g., Rosse 
et al., 1998), which found that those who were most dishonest in their responses were 
most likely to be hired.   
Conclusion  
In conclusion, a review of the literature identifies five main issues.  First, there is 
no longer any question as to whether most non-cognitive measures can be faked; evidence 
consistently shows they can be faked to a substantial extent.  Second, there is mounting 
evidence that faking is prevalent in applied settings, although there is still some debate 
surrounding this issue.  Third, research has shown that some methods can help deter 
faking on non-cognitive measures.  Fourth, faking has been shown to lower both construct 
and criterion validity, although this effect is not always found.  Regardless, it is clear that 
faking can still have strong effects on hiring decisions even when criterion validity is 
statistically unaffected.  Fifth, research suggests that faking consists of more than just the 
social desirability construct.  Job desirability is a viable alternative which may account for 
faking more accurately than social desirability in job applicant settings.  Finally, job 
desirability measures are more sensitive to faking than social desirability measures and 
should therefore be tested in applied settings. 
The Proposed Research:  Purpose and Hypotheses 
 The current study aimed to investigate and clarify various issues which, up to this 
point, have not been completely resolved in the faking literature.  This section discusses 
each issue which the current  study investigated, along with proposed hypotheses for 




settings and the potential effects of faking on hiring decisions. The subsequent 4 
hypotheses investigated the construct validity of job desirability measures and their 
potential for detecting job-specific applicant faking. 
First, this study addressed whether or not faking does occur in applied settings.   This 
was accomplished by addressing a major obstacle in faking research – the need for more 
applied samples of job applicants and incumbents.  It is often difficult to obtain actual 
selection data in any area of I/O Psychology research, and even more difficult to assess 
whether some type of applicant faking occurred and affected hiring decisions or test 
validity.  Therefore, only a limited amount of studies have investigated this issue in 
applied settings, and results have been contradictory, as discussed in the preceding review 
(e.g., Hough et al., 1990; Rosse et al., 1998).  The only way in which researchers can 
eventually determine whether faking actually does occur in applied settings is to capture it 
in actual selection settings.  This sentiment regarding the need for faking studies in 
applied settings was echoed by the chair of a symposium on applicant faking at the 17th 
Annual Meeting of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP) in 
Toronto.  At the conclusion of the symposia presentations, she concluded with the remark 
that although many of the theoretical and methodological ideas proposed and tested 
successfully (mostly in laboratory settings) were promising, it was still necessary for these 
ideas to be applied to actual job applicants in order to ultimately assess their utility (Ryan, 
2002).  Thus, laboratory studies have provided much insight and testable hypotheses in 
regards to faking research, but in and of themselves, they cannot provide the answer to 




Hence, this study contributed to the existing faking research by assessing whether job 
applicants in actual selection settings fake on non-cognitive measures.  As discussed 
earlier, many applied studies suggest that applicants fake in selection settings (Griffith et 
al., 2007; Birkeland et al, 2006; Weekley et al., 2003).  One of the purposes of this study 
was to add to the extant literature by confirming these previous findings.  However, the 
majority of these applied studies used traditional faking methods, such as social 
desirability scales, to measure faking.  Few of these applied studies used alternative 
measures of faking, and even fewer have used job desirability measures.  For these 
reasons, the proposed study makes an important contribution to the faking literature by 
using a job desirability scale to measure faking in an applicant setting, and comparing it to 
a traditional social desirability scale. 
In order to confirm findings from previous studies, this study examinedresponses to 
personality and faking measures from a sample of applicants who applied for sales and 
managerial positions and then compared these responses to those collected from a 
separate sample of job incumbents employed in the same positions.  It was expected that 
applicants would be more motivated than incumbents to fake on all selection measures in 
order to increase the likelihood of being hired for the job they are applying for.  Therefore 
applicant scores on the personality and faking measures should be higher than incumbent 
scores in for both sales and manager positions.  For the purposes of this study, the faking 
measure was a job desirability scale developed specifically  for sales and management 
positions for the purposes of this study.  A traditional social desirability scale was also 




Hypothesis 1a:  For both sales and management jobs, applicants will score 
significantly higher than incumbents on all personality measures 
Hypothesis 1b:  For both sales and management jobs, applicants will score 
significantly higher than incumbents on job desirability measures 
An important part of this investigation was the test of whether faking adversely affects 
actual hiring decisions to any substantial, and practical, extent.  As previously discussed, 
validity coefficients for a whole sample of applicants may not decrease for various 
reasons, but hiring decisions can still be affected if a large percentage of fakers rise to the 
top of the applicant pool and are subsequently hired because of their high scores on a 
selection instrument such as a personality test (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Rosse et al., 
1998; Zickar et al., 1996).  To assess whether this is the case, this study examined the 
extent to which applicants who fake on personality measures rise to the top of the 
personality score distribution and thus are over-represented at the high end of the 
applicant pool.  Specifically, this study assessed whether the proportion of fakers at 
selection ratios of 50% or lower (more selective) is higher than the proportion of fakers in 
the entire sample of applicants.  Fakers were operationalized as applicants who scored at 
the 95th percentile or higher on the job desirability scale that pertained to their job.  In 
addition, this study assessed whether the percentage of fakers that would be selected using 
a top-down selection approach increases as the selection ratio becomes more selective.  It 
is important to examine low selection ratios because the lower the selection ratio, the 
more selective a hiring organization can be.  Thus actual organizations typically use low 




In effect, this portion of the current research makes a new contribution to the 
existing research on faking by examining whether fakers “rise to the top” of the applicant 
distribution using an alternative method to classify applicants as fakers – a job desirability 
scale.  To date, no studies testing the “rise to the top effect” have used this type of faking 
measure.  To further illustrate this point, in the Rosse et al. (1998), the authors identified 
fakers who rose to the top as those who scored highly on a measure of impression 
management (the BIDR-IM, Paulhus, 1991).  Although this served as an excellent 
departure from the simple examination of validity coefficients, this method introduces the 
problems associated with using impression management scales which were described 
earlier.  The other studies cited earlier which examined this “rise to the top” effect used 
different methods.  Zickar et al. (1996) and Douglas et al. (1996) used computer 
simulations to model what the effects would be if applicants raised their scores on 
personality measures by various differing amounts.  Therefore, in these studies, the 
personality measures themselves were used as the faking measures in these studies.  And 
as for the Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) study, faking was equated with being a participant 
in the incentive condition of a laboratory study, which implicitly encouraged respondents 
to fake.  Therefore, none of the studies which investigated the “rise to the top” effect 
actually used any external measure of faking to classify respondents as fakers.  The 
current builds upon this existing line of research by attempting to replicate the “rise to the 
top” effect while using a job desirability measure to identify fakers and assess whether 
they disproportionately increase their chances of being selected relative to non-fakers.  It 




in comparison to non-fakers.  In addition, this overrepresentation was expected to increase 
as the size of the selection ratio decreased. 
Hypothesis 2a:  For both sales and manager applicants, at selection ratios of 50% 
or lower, the proportion of fakers will be disproportionately higher in the group of 
people selected than the proportion of fakers in the full sample.  Fakers will be 
identified as applicants who scored at the 95th percentile or higher on the job 
desirability scale. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: For both sales and manager applicants, as the selection ratio 
decreases, the proportion of fakers that will be hired will increase.  Fakers will be 
identified applicants who scored in the 95th percentile or higher on the job 
desirability scale. 
Job desirability is a response bias that, by definition, should be job specific (Kluger & 
Collela; Miller & Tristan, 2002).  In other words, personality traits or experience 
qualifications which are relevant to one job may not be as relevant or desirable for a job 
which is very different , which has been shown to be the case when people are instructed 
to fake towards a specific job description (Mudgett, 2000; Raymark, 2004).  Hence, an 
applicant for a particular job should only fake on job desirability items which are relevant 
to that job.  Such a finding would lend important evidence of construct validity for the job 
desirability measure being used in this study, and on a broader scale, to the general 
construct of job desirability itself.  This question was examined in this study by assessing 
whether sales applicants fake more on sales job desirability items than on management job 




would fake more on job desirability items that were relevant to their job (sales or 
management) than on items that were not relevant to their job. 
Hypothesis 3a:  Sales applicants’ mean score on the sales job desirability scale 
will be significantly higher than their mean score on the manager job desirability 
scale. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Management applicants’ mean score on the manager job 
desirability scale will be significantly higher than their mean score on the sales job 
desirability scale. 
 Although this hypothesis provided a valuable within-subjects test of whether 
applicants fake more on job-specific items, it could be possible that applicants for other 
jobs fake to the same extent on the same items, indicating that faking may not be 
consistently job-specific.  In order to rule out this possibility as well, a between-subjects 
test comparing sales and manager applicants scores on each of job desirability scales also 
was conducted.  It was hypothesized that sales applicants would fake more than manager 
applicants on the sales job desirability scale, whereas those applying for managerial 
positions would outscore sales applicants on the manager job desirability scale. 
Hypothesis 4a:  Sales applicants will score significantly higher than manager 
applicants on the sales job desirability scale. 
Hypothesis 4b:  Manager applicants will score significantly higher than sales 
applicants on the manager job desirability scale. 
Although job desirability is different from social desirability, the impression 
management component of social desirability does share a common characteristic with job 




1991).  Although job desirability aims at producing a portrait of a perfect applicant for a 
specific job, whereas social desirability involves a portrait of an all-around good person in 
general, they are both deliberate ways of faking on non-cognitive measures.  One study in 
particular reported a low to moderate correlation between job desirability and the 
impression management factor of social desirability, but very little if any relationship 
between job desirability and the self-deception factor of social desirability, as this factor 
does not represent deliberate response distortion (Carroll et al., 2004).  Moreover, Griffith 
et al. (2004) reported that neither impression management nor self-deception correlated 
significantly with faking (as measured by score differences between faking and honest 
conditions).  The current study attempted to shed additional light on these findings by 
investigating in a field setting the relationships between faking and the two components of 
social desirability.  It was hypothesized that the job desirability measure used in this study 
would correlate moderately with impression management, but not with self-deception.  
Confirmation of this finding would display further evidence of construct validity for job 
desirability and strengthen the notion that it captures deliberate deception rather than true 
personality variance.   
Hypothesis 5a:  In applicant data for both job types, there will be a low to 
moderate correlation between job desirability and the impression management 
subscale of social desirability. 
Hypothesis 5b:  In applicant data for both job types, there will be a negligible 
correlation between job desirability and the self-deception management subscale 




 As was discussed in the review, many job desirability measures have used a bogus 
item approach, where respondents are asked whether they have experience or familiarity 
with non-existent tasks, training, or equipment.  This approach has proven to be fruitful as 
far as detecting applicant faking, since all answers are verifiable.  However, one concern 
with bogus items is that applicants may truly believe that they have experience with these 
bogus tasks, training, or equipment because they are confusing them with ones that really 
do exist (Carroll et al., 2004).  This was one concern expressed by the discussant at  a 
faking symposium presented during the 2004Society for Industrial & Organizational 
Psychology (SIOP) conference (McDaniel, 2004).  For example, if the name of a bogus 
training program is similar enough to an actual training program that the applicant has 
undergone, the applicant may respond that they have this type of training when in fact 
they do not.  Although this person would not be intentionally faking in this case, that item 
would label him or her as a faker simply due to an honest misunderstanding on the part of 
the applicant.  This would be an example of the faking measure resulting in a false 
positive (Carroll et al., 2004). 
In order to assess whether any misunderstandings such as these may have contributed 
to job desirability scores indicative of faking, incumbents’ job desirability scores were 
examined.  If results indicated that applicants indeed faked their responses whereas 
incumbents did not, the mean job desirability score for applicants should be higher than 
that of incumbents, as is posited by Hypothesis 1.  However, in order to show that the job 
desirability measure is not detecting false positives, the average score for incumbents 
should be extremely low, or close to zero.  Assuming that job incumbents have no 




scored as a zero, then incumbents should have a minimal score (not significantly greater 
than zero) on a job desirability measure consisting of bogus items, such as the one which 
will be used in the current study.  This finding would indicate that the job desirability 
measure results in a minimal amount of false positives.  In comparison, applicants’ mean 
job desirability score should be much higher than this and would be significantly greater 
than zero.  If the job desirability measure used in this study did result in a minimal amount 
of false positives, it would provide additional construct validity in the sense that it is 
measuring actual applicant deception, rather than unintended errors on the part of 
applicants.  Therefore it was expected that for incumbents, scores on the job desirability 
measure would approach zero whereas applicants’ mean scores would be significantly 
greater than zero. 
Hypothesis 6a: Incumbent mean scores on the job desirability scales will not be 
significantly greater than zero. 
Hypothesis 6b: Applicant mean scores on the job desirability scales will be 
significantly greater than zero. 
It is quite plausible that job experience in a similar line of work could help an 
applicant distort their responses in a more job-specific fashion than someone who knows 
little about the target job.  More importantly, it is possible that a person with highly 
relevant experience may also fake in a more subtle manner, making it difficult to detect 
distortion because he or she does not need to fake on every item, but only on job-relevant 
items.  This could be due to job-related knowledge gained over several years of 




instances a person would encounter several types of selection instruments which are used 
to select applicants for that type of job.   
Therefore, it is possible that applicants with greater amounts of experience in sales or 
management are more likely to distort their responses in a job-desirable manner.  This 
finding would give a further indication that job desirability is highly job specific, thus 
lending further evidence of construct validity for job desirability.    
Due to the novelty of job desirability measures in faking research, no studies to date 
have investigated whether job-specific faking behavior can in any way be predicted by 
years of job experience.  Hence, this analysis also contributed to the existing faking 
research.  It was predicted that job desirability scores would correlate with years of job 
experience in the specific job that applicants were applying for. 
Hypothesis 7:  For applicants, years of job experience in a similar position will be 




III.  METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 1,780 job applicants and incumbents participated in the study.  
However, only 958 of these were applying for, or employed in, sales or manager 
positions.  The remaining 822 participants were individuals applying for other types of 
positions, which were not within the scope of this study.  Therefore data from these 
individuals were not included.  It should be noted that this study specifically excluded any 
individuals applying for, or currently employed in, sales manager positions.  This was 
done in order to minimize any possible confounding effects due to positions that 
combined both sales and manager requirements. 
For the purposes of this study, the applicant sample consisted of 632 sales job 
applicants and 112 management job applicants from various cities throughout the U.S.  
The incumbent sample consisted of 130 individuals currently employed in sales positions 
and 84 currently employed in management positions.  Data from these participants was 
gathered through a private management consulting firm located in the Midwestern U.S., 
which carries out web-based assessments for multiple client organizations for the 
purposes of selection and employee development.  A subset of the sales incumbent sample 
was provided by a second consulting firm located in the Eastern U.S. which also carries 
out similar web-based assessments for employee selection and development.  Sales 
incumbents from this subset underwent a similar web-based assessment for the same 





one of the measures included in this study.  All applicants who participated were being 
assessed as part of the hiring process for a position (sales or manager) they were seeking 
with an organization.  However, all incumbents who participated were being assessed by 
their current employer only for career development and training purposes.  Their results 
were not used for promotional or selection/de-selection purposes. 
Measures  
Demographics.  A measure was administered to all participants that asked them to 
voluntarily provide their age, gender, race, and years of overall experience working in a 
job similar to what they were currently applying for or employed in.  
Personality Measures.  Goldberg’s International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) 
scales were chosen as the principal measure of personality in this study because of their 
high correlations with two other well-known Big Five personality measures, the NEO-PI-
R (McCrae & Costa, 1992) and the Hogan Personality Inventory (Hogan, 1992).  These 
high correlations were obtained in a study which used a sample of 501 subjects who 
completed several published personality measures in addition to the IPIP scales 
(Goldberg, 1999). 
In this study, two of the IPIP Big Five scales were used – the Conscientiousness 
and Extraversion scales.  These scales are both five-point graphic rating scales with a 
response format as follows:  1 = Very Inaccurate, 2 = Moderately Inaccurate, 3 = Neither 
Inaccurate or Accurate, 4 = Moderately Accurate, and 5 = Very Accurate.  In order to 
avoid adding excessive testing time to the consulting firm’s assessment, the 10-item 





The 10-item IPIP Conscientiousness scale has an alpha of .81, compared with an 
alpha of .71 for the NEO-PI-R Conscientiousness scale, and correlates .79 (.92 when 
corrected for attenuation due to scale unreliability) with the NEO-PI-R Conscientiousness 
scale.  The 10-item IPIP Extraversion scale has an alpha of .86, compared with an alpha of 
.76 for the NEO-PI-R Extraversion scale, and correlates .77 (.88 corrected) with the NEO-
PI-R Extraversion scale.  Therefore, it is apparent that the shorter IPIP scale versions still 
retain satisfactory psychometric quality. 
In addition, two IPIP scales corresponding with the Hogan Personality Inventory 
(HPI) occupational scales were included in the study.  The first occupational scale - the 
IPIP Gregariousness scale - correlates .73 (.84 corrected) with the HPI Sales Potential 
scale and has an alpha of .86.  The second occupational scale used was the IPIP 
Competence scale, which correlates .62 (.78 corrected) with the HPI Managerial Potential 
scale and has an alpha of .80.  Both of these scales consist of 10 items, and they have the 
same 5-point graphic scale response format as the IPIP Conscientiousness and 
Extraversion scales described above. 
Social Desirability Measure.  To measure social desirability, the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1984) was used.  This measure 
consists of two subscales, Impression Management and Self-Deception, which are each 20 
items in length.  The Impression Management subscale has an alpha ranging from .75 to 
.86 and the Self-Deception subscale has an alpha ranging from .68 to .80.  The response 
format for all items is a seven-point graphic rating scale ranging from 1 = Not True to 7 = 





is scored dichotomously.  Only extreme responses of 1, or 2, count as socially desirable 
responses.     
Job Desirability Measure.  To measure job desirability, two scales were developed 
for this study.  One scale targeted sales jobs and the other targeted management jobs.  
Each scale consisted of 12 bogus items that asked participants whether they had 
experience, or were familiar with, various terms or procedures that were superficially 
relevant to the particular job that they were applying for, but were in fact non-existent.  
An example of such an item is, “I have read Tony Robinet’s book entitled Sales for the 
Third Millennium.”  Such a book does not exist; therefore it is verifiably impossible to 
have read it.  All items had three response options: "True", "False", and "Not Sure.”   This 
scale also was scored dichotomously.  Only items endorsed as “True” were counted as 
faked responses.  Items endorsed as “False” and “Not Sure” were not scored as faked 
responses.  A very similar job desirability measure constructed for a previous laboratory 
study on the same topic (Miller & Tristan, 2002) displayed adequate reliability in an 
honest-instruction condition (alpha = .70) and highly satisfactory reliability in a faking-
instruction condition (alpha = .98).  
In order to increase the realism of these items to applicants and help conceal their 
true purpose (to detect faking), these bogus items were combined with items that asked 
them about their experience with actual terms or procedures that did exist and were either 
related to sales or management jobs.  Eight of these “filler” items were added to both the 
sales and manager job desirability scales.  Therefore, the total number of items comprising 
each scale was actually 20 items, but only 12 of the items actually comprised each scale 





As noted previously in the Hypotheses section, faking in this study was 
operationalized as having scored at the 95th percentile or higher on the job desirability 
scale.  As such, sales applicants who scored in the 95th percentile or higher on the sales 
job desirability scale were identified as fakers in the sales group.  The same procedure 
was carried out for the manager applicant group using the manager job desirability scale 
scores. 
Procedure 
Description of Assessment Process.  Participants completed all of the measures 
included in this study concurrently with the consulting firm’s web-based assessment.  The 
assessment procedure of the consulting firm for selection projects is such that job 
applicants who wish to apply for a given job with a client company (of the consulting 
firm) must undergo the consulting firm’s assessment on-line over the internet.  All 
applicants are assigned log-in identification numbers by the organization whom they are 
applying with and instructed to take the assessment on their own time from any given 
location.  All applicants then complete the assessment.  Once the entire assessment is 
completed, the consulting firm makes a recommendation to the client organization, which 
in turn, uses this recommendation as part of their own overall selection process in order to 
make a hiring decision regarding each applicant.  Each firm’s instructions and assessment 
were administered in full prior to administration of the instructions and measures that 
were part of this study. 
As noted earlier, a second consulting firm provided data for part of the incumbent 
sample.  These data were only for sales incumbents, however.  Both firm’s procedures for 





fact that those being assessed are employees working for client companies.  The purpose 
of these assessments is not for selection, but for organizations to assess their current talent 
for a variety of purposes, such as career development, needs assessment, and succession 
planning.  It should be noted that the sales incumbent participants from this subset only 
completed the Sales Job Desirability measure.  Due to time constraints, they were not 
administered any of the personality or social desirability scales, nor were they 
administered the Manager Job Desirability scale. 
Instructions.  When participants logged in to take the assessment, they were 
presented with either one of the consulting firm’s standard on-line assessment 
instructions, which are shown in Appendix D, followed by the assessment of the firm.  
The assessment processes used for this study did not differ from either consulting firm’s 
standard administration process in any manner aside from the inclusion of the measures 
pertaining to this study, which were added in a final section at the end of each firm’s 
standard assessment.  All testing instructions pertaining to this study, also shown in 
Appendix D, were the same regardless of the consulting firm. 
Debriefing and Informed Consent.  Originally this study was planned as a within-
subject design quasi-experiment, where participants would complete all measures as 
applicants (Time 1) and would then volunteer to complete the same measures again as 
employees (Time 2) after being hired by an organization.  As such, a debriefing statement 
was to be administered to participants after they had completed the second administration 
of the assessment.  However, near the end of the Time 1 data collection phase, it was 
learned that a Time 2 data collection phase would not be possible.  Hence, the study 





As a result, the participants in the applicant group did not receive a debriefing statement 
after they completed the measures in this study.  In order to keep consistency across 
applicant and incumbent groups, a debriefing statement was not provided to participants 
in the incumbent group.   
Additionally, it should be noted that due to the nature of this applied study, which 
compared effects of an applicant versus an incumbent setting on test scores, it was crucial 
that applicants believed that all the measures that they were completing were being used 
for actual hiring recommendations.  Therefore, informed consent was not collected for 
applicants in this study.  In order to maintain test setting consistency across applicant and 
incumbent samples, it was not collected for incumbents either.  Due to the fact that the 
measures administered in this study were very similar in nature to those being 
administered by the firm, and the fact that the addition of measures in this study only 
added approximately 15 minutes of assessment time without inducing any additional 
stress or harm to participants, the omission of informed consent at this initial stage did not 






IV.  RESULTS 
Demographics 
The average age of participants was 34.52 years (SD = 10.24), with a range of 19 
to 66 years.  The sample consisted of 570 (59.5%) male participants and 360 (37.6%) 
female participants.  Seventy-one percent of participants were Caucasian, 9.7% African 
American, 7% Asian, and 5.4% Hispanic.  Over half (52.6%) of the sample possessed 5 or 
less years’ experience in a job similar to what they were currently applying for or 
employed in (either sales or management) and 21% possessed 10 or more years of 
experience.  Eighty percent of participants were either applying for, or currently employed 
in, sales jobs, whilst 20% were applying for, or employed in, management jobs.  
Individuals applying for alternative positions, such as sales managers, professional and 
technical, customer service, and administrative, also participated in the study.  As noted 
earlier, however, their data were not included as part of the study and are not included in 
the aforementioned demographic statistics. Table 1a lists demographic data only for 
participants who were included in the study whereas Table 1b lists demographic data for 
all individuals who participated, regardless of their inclusion in the study. 
Scale Reliabilities 
 Scale inter-correlations and reliabilities for all scales are presented in Tables 2a 
through 2g for the following sample subsets: full sample, sales only, managers only, sales 





coefficients for all measures were acceptable, ranging from .75 to .83 in the full sample 
and ranging from .63 to .89 across these other sample subsets. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.  Hypothesis 1a predicted that, for both sales and manager jobs, 
applicants would score significantly higher than incumbents on all personality scales.  The 
four personality scales were Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Competence, and 
Gregariousness.  In order to test this hypothesis, independent measures t-tests were 
conducted to compare applicant versus incumbent mean scores on the four personality 
scales for both job types.  As shown in Table 3a, sales applicants scored significantly 
higher than sales incumbents on all four personality scales.  However, manager applicants 
scored significantly higher than manager incumbents only on two of the four personality 
scales - Conscientiousness and Competence (see Table 3b).  Therefore Hypothesis 1a was 
partially supported. 
 An examination of scatter plot graphs revealed the scores on all personality scales 
appeared negatively skewed.  Tests for skewness and kurtosis were conducted in order to 
assess the degree to which these scores were non-normally distributed.  Results from 
skewness tests confirmed that all personality scale scores exhibited a degree of non-
symmetrical distribution which indicated a departure from normality based on the fact that 
skewness values for all scales were more than twice the magnitude of their standard errors 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  In addition, tests for kurtosis were conducted to assess 
whether the clustering observed in personality scores suggested non-normality.   
Kurtosis values also were more than twice the magnitude of their standard errors for all 





further evidence of non-normality in the personality scores.  Hence based on tests for 
skewness and kurtosis, scores on all four personality scales were deemed to be non-
normally distributed, both in the full sample and in the sales and manager samples. 
 In order to avoid violations of normality, nonparametric tests were also conducted 
to test Hypothesis 1a (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  A series of Mann-Whitney U-tests 
were thus conducted to test whether applicant scores on each of the scales were 
significantly higher than incumbent scores for both sales and manager jobs.  As shown in 
Table 3a, results from the Mann-Whitney U-tests differed only slightly than results from 
the t-tests.  Although sales applicants outscored sales incumbents on all scales, these 
differences were significant only for Extraversion and Gregariousness.  Conversely, in the 
manager group applicants outscored incumbents on all scales but these differences were 
only significant for Conscientiousness and Competence (see Table 3b).  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1a also was partially supported using a nonparametric version of the 
independent measures t-test. Results were highly similar to those obtained with a 
parametric test and differed only in terms of significance levels for two of the scales in the 
manager job group. 
 Hypothesis 1b predicted that, for both sales and manager jobs, applicants would 
score significantly higher than incumbents on the job desirability scale that was developed 
for their job group (sales or manager).  In order to test this hypothesis, independent 
measures t-tests were conducted to compare applicant versus incumbent mean scores on 
the job desirability scales for both job groups.  Table 3c illustrates that in the sales group, 
applicants did not score significantly higher than incumbents on the sales job desirability 





statistical significance (t = 1.77, p = .08).  For managers, however, this hypothesis was 
supported in that applicants scored significantly higher than incumbents (t = 3.77, p < 
.001) on the manager job desirability scale (see Table 3d).  Therefore Hypothesis 1b was 
partially supported. 
 As with Hypothesis 1a, skewness and kurtosis tests revealed that job desirability 
scores were also non-normally distributed.  This was evidenced by high positive skewness 
values for the sales and manager job desirability scales in the full sample and in both the 
sales and manager sample subsets.  These positive skew values were all well above twice 
the magnitude of their standard errors.  Kurtosis values also indicated some degree of non-
normality in the job desirability scores.  Therefore, nonparametric tests were also 
conducted to test Hypothesis 1b. 
 Mann-Whitney U-tests confirmed findings from the independent measures t-tests 
(see Tables 3c and 3d).  Sales applicants did not score significantly higher than sales 
incumbents on the sales job desirability scale, although they did score higher and this 
difference approached statistical significance (Z = -1.86, p = .06).  As for managers, 
applicants did score significantly higher than incumbents (Z = -3.86, p < .001) on the 
manager job desirability scale, providing partial support for Hypothesis 1b using 
nonparametric tests. 
 Tables 11a and 11b provide descriptive data each item comprising the sales and 
manager job desirability scales, respectively.  In addition, this table provides standardized 
mean differences in item means between the sales and manager applicant groups. 
Hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 2a predicted that, for both sales and manager applicant 





disproportionately higher than the proportion of fakers in the full sample.  In order to test 
Hypothesis 2a, the first step was to identify the fakers in the sales applicant group and the 
fakers in the manager applicant group.  Sales applicants were classified as fakers if their 
sales job desirability score was at, or above, the 95th percentile of job desirability scores 
within the sales applicant sample.  The same procedure was conducted for manager 
applicants using the manager job desirability score in order to identify fakers in this 
group.  This procedure resulted in classifying all sales applicants with scores of seven or 
higher as a sales faker.  In other words, any sales applicant who responded “yes” to seven 
or more of the 12 sales bogus items was classified as a faker.  For managers, those with 
scores of six or higher (responding “yes” to six or more of the 12 manager bogus items) 
were classified as manager fakers.  Previous faking studies have used the 95th percentile as 
a cut-off using social desirability scales in order to classify respondents or applicants as 
fakers (Ellingson et al.2001; Rosse et al., 1998), therefore the same cut-off was used for 
the job desirability measures in this study. 
Next, the percentage of fakers who would be hired (based on a top-down rank 
ordering of personality scores) from each job applicant group were calculated.  These 
percentages were calculated for each of the four personality scales using the following 
selection ratios:  .50, .25, .10, and .05.  These resulting percentages of fakers who would 
be hired were then compared to the percentage of fakers in the whole sample of applicants 
in order to assess whether each percentage was higher than the percentage of fakers in the 
full sample.  As shown in Tables 4a and 4b, results indicated that at any selection ratio of 





of fakers in the full sample.  These results were found for both sales and manager jobs, 
thus Hypothesis 2a was fully supported. 
Hypothesis 2b predicted that for both sales and manager applicant groups, as the 
selection ratio decreased (thus becoming increasingly selective), the proportion of fakers 
hired would increase.  This hypothesis was supported, as shown in Tables 4a and 4b.  In 
both job groups, the percentage of fakers that would be hired increased as the selection 
ratio decreased.  The proportion of fakers consistently increased in a linear fashion for all 
personality scales from selection ratios of .50 through .10 although they held constant 
from selection ratios of .10 to .05. 
Hypothesis 3.  Hypothesis 3 provided a within-subjects test of whether applicant 
faking on the job desirability measures would display a job-specific pattern by assessing 
whether each applicant group (sales or manager) would score significantly higher on the 
job desirability score that pertained to their job group.  In order to test Hypothesis 3a, a 
dependent-measures t-test was used to assess whether sales applicant mean scores on the 
sales job desirability measure were significantly higher than their mean scores on the 
management job desirability measure.  Results, displayed in Table 3, indicated that sales 
applicants scored significantly higher (t = 11.78, p < .001) on the sales job desirability 
scale than they did on the manager job desirability scale.  Using a Wilcoxon’s Signed 
Ranks test, a nonparametric version of a dependent-measures t-test, these results were 
replicated (Z = -10.75, p < .001).  Thus, Hypothesis 3a was fully supported both 
parametric and nonparametric tests. 
 Similarly, to test Hypothesis 3b, a dependent-measures t-test was used to assess 





was significantly higher than their mean score on the sales job desirability measure.  
Results indicated that although managers scored higher on the manager scale than on the 
sales scale, this difference was not statistically significant (t = 0.97, p > .05).  As similar 
results were found using a Wilcoxon’s Signed Ranks test (Z = -0.94, p > .05), Hypothesis 
3b was not supported.  Consequently, Hypothesis 3 received only partial support. 
Hypothesis 4.  In contrast to the previous hypothesis, Hypothesis 4 provided a 
between-subjects test of whether faking was job-specific on the job desirability measures.  
Hypothesis 4a posited that sales applicants would score significantly higher than their 
manager counterparts on the sales job desirability scale.  To test this hypothesis, an 
independent-measures t-test was conducted to assess whether sales applicants’ mean score 
on the sales job desirability measure was significantly higher than that of management 
applicants.  Results did not support this hypothesis, however.  Sales applicants scored 
higher than manager applicants on the sales job desirability scale, however, the difference 
only approached statistical significance (p = .07).  Nonetheless, when a Mann-Whitney U-
test was utilized to test this hypothesis, the difference was statistically significant (Z = -
2.33, p < .05), with sales applicants scoring significantly higher on sales job desirability 
than manager applicants. 
 Hypothesis 4b was complimentary to Hypothesis 4a in that it predicted that 
manager applicants would outscore sales applicants on the manager job desirability scale. 
In order to test this, an independent-measures t-test was used to assess whether manager 
applicants’ mean score on the manager job desirability scale was significantly higher than 
that of sales applicants.  It was found that manager applicants scored significantly higher 





these results also were found using a Mann-Whitney U-test (Z = -3.34, p < .01), offering 
support for Hypothesis 4b.  As a result, Hypothesis 4 was fully supported using 
nonparametric tests but only was partially supported using parametric tests.  Full results 
are provided in Table 6. 
Together, Hypotheses 3 and 4 provided separate within- and between-subject tests 
of whether faking on the job desirability measures was job specific.  As discussed, results 
from the separate t-tests suggested that this was the case, which indicated the presence of 
a job group (sales or manager) by job desirability scale version (sales or manager version) 
interaction.  In order to confirm the presence of such an interaction, it was decided to 
conduct a follow-up analysis to Hypotheses 3 and 4 using an Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA), which provided a more statistically powerful and parsimonious method with 
which to test the combined effects of job type and scale version on job desirability scores.  
Thus, a 2 (Job Desirability Scale Version) x 2 (Job Group) mixed-design ANOVA was 
conducted.  The two independent variables were Scale Version and Job Group, where 
Scale Version was the repeated measures factor and Job Group was the between-subjects 
factor.  Scores on the two job desirability scales were used as the dependent variable. 
It was expected that a significant Scale Version x Job Group interaction would be 
observed whereby scores on the two versions of the job desirability scales would 
significantly differ by job group.  Prior to conducting this analysis, a test for homogeneity 
of variance was conducted to assess whether the error variance of the job desirability 
scores was equal across sales and manager groups.  A Levene’s Test of Equality of Error 
Variances indicated that the data did not violate any assumptions of homogeneity for 





was not necessary to conduct tests for sphericity due to the fact that there were only two 
levels of the repeated measures variable (sales and manager version of the job desirability 
scale). 
Results of this analysis revealed that the main effect for job group was not 
significant [F (1,741) = .15, p > .05, Eta-squared = 00].  Thus there was no significant 
difference between sales applicants (M = 1.94) and manager applicants (M = 2.02) on 
overall job desirability scores.  A significant main effect for Scale Version was obtained, 
[F (1,741) = 13.82, p < .001], though this was a weak effect (Eta-squared = .02).  
Applicants overall scored higher on the sales job desirability scale (M = 2.15) than they 
did on the manager scale (M = 1.80).  However, a significant Scale Version x Job Group 
was also observed, [F (1,741) = 29.63, p < .001, Eta-squared = .04].  Examination of the 
cell means indicated that applicants’ scores on the two versions of the job desirability 
scale differed based upon the type of job they were applying for.  Specifically, sales 
applicants (M = 2.37) scored higher on the sales job desirability scale than they did on the 
manager scale (M = 1.51).  However, the reverse pattern was observed for manager 
applicants, who scored higher on the manager job desirability scale (M = 2.10) than they 
did on the sales scale (M = 1.94).  A graphical representation of this interaction is shown 
in Figure 1.  The results of this follow-up analysis thus support the findings from 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 by providing evidence that responses on the job desirability scales 
differed according to the type of job that applicants were seeking.  Results for this follow-
up analysis are presented in Table 7. 
Hypothesis 5.  Hypothesis 5 addressed the degree of association between job 





deception.  Hypothesis 5a posited that job desirability would be significantly correlated 
with impression management in each applicant job group.  In order to test Hypothesis 5a, 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficients were calculated in order to assess whether the 
correlation between job desirability and impression management for applicants in both job 
groups was statistically different from zero and of moderate strength.  For the sales 
applicant group, the correlation between the sales job desirability scale and the impression 
management scale was statistically significant and positive (r = .12, p < .01) whilst for the 
manager applicant group, the manager job desirability scale also was significantly and 
positively related to the impression management scale (r = .30, p < .01).  Thus, 
Hypothesis 5a was supported. 
Hypothesis 5b predicted that job desirability would not significantly correlate with 
the self-deception scale.  Pearson’s r correlation coefficients again were conducted to test 
this hypothesis.  Contrary to expectation, in the sales applicant group, sales job 
desirability significantly and positively correlated with self-deception (r = .21, p < .001).  
Likewise, in the manager applicant group, the manager job desirability scale also was 
significantly and positively correlated with self-deception (r = .35, p < .001).    As these 
results failed to support Hypothesis 5b, only partial support was found for Hypothesis 5.   
Hypotheses 5a and 5b also were tested using Spearman’s rho correlation 
coefficients due to the previously discussed non-normal distribution of the job desirability 
scores.  These results closely mirrored those found using Pearson’s correlations, thus 
lending the same partial support for Hypothesis 5.  Full results using both types of 





 Hypothesis 6.  Hypothesis 6 investigated whether job incumbents engaged in any 
discernable amount of faking in comparison to job applicants.  As such, Hypothesis 6a 
predicted that incumbents would have mean scores on the job desirability measures that 
were not significantly different than zero whereas Hypothesis 6b predicted that applicant 
scores on the same measures would be significantly higher than zero.  In order to test 
these hypotheses, for both job groups, a one-sample t-test was calculated using 
incumbents’ mean job desirability score to assess whether it is significantly different from 
zero.  The same procedure was then conducted for applicants from both job groups. A 
statistically insignificant finding would indicate that the job desirability scale resulted in a 
minimal amount of false positives, or individuals whom were falsely identified as fakers. 
Results did not support Hypothesis 6a.  Sales incumbents scored significantly 
higher than zero (t = 10.60, p < .001) on the sales job desirability scale, as did manager 
incumbents on the manager job desirability scale (t = 6.73, p < .001).  This suggested that 
incumbents from both job groups actively engaged in at least some level of faking. 
As expected, however, Hypothesis 6b was supported.  Sales applicants scored 
significantly higher than zero (t = 26.09, p < .001) on the sales job desirability scale and 
manager applicants scored significantly higher than zero (t = 10.10, p < .001) on the 
manager job desirability scale.   These analyses were then replicated using a one-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a nonparametric version of the one-sample t-test.  
Results from these nonparametric tests revealed the same findings; incumbents and 
applicants from both job groups all had mean job desirability scores that were 





regardless of using parametric versus nonparametric test use.  Full results are displayed in 
Tables 9a and 9b. 
Hypothesis 7.  Hypothesis 7 predicted that job experience would be positively 
correlated with the extent of faking observed.  In order to test Hypothesis 7, for both 
applicant job groups, Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated in order to assess 
whether job experience in a similar job was significantly and positively correlated with 
job desirability scores.  Results provided partial support for Hypothesis 7.  In the sales 
applicant sample, the sales job desirability scale correlated significantly and positively (r 
= .26, p < .001) with job experience.  However, this was not the case in the manager 
applicant sample, where only a weak and non-significant positive correlation was found 
between the manager job desirability scale and job experience (r = .07, p > .05). 
Highly similar results were found using Spearman’s rho correlations.  Thus, only 
partial support was found for Hypothesis 7 using both parametric and non-parametric 




V.  DISCUSSION 
Although the current study confirmed some of the previous findings in the 
literature on applicant faking, it made various unique contributions as well.  The findings 
from Hypothesis 1a replicated findings from multiple studies in which applicants have 
scored significantly higher on personality measures than incumbents using between-
subjects designs in an applied setting (Birkeland et al., 2006; Robie et al., 2001; Weekley 
et al., 2003).  Sales applicants scored significantly higher than sales applicants on the four 
personality measures (only two scales when non-parametric tests were used).  Manager 
applicants also tended to score higher than manager incumbents, although these 
differences were significant for only two of the four scales, regardless of significance test 
type.  Thus, differences in personality scores reflected a degree of faking on the part of 
applicants, although the magnitude of this bias varied depending on the job type and the 
personality scale in question. 
Upon further review, the observed pattern of differences on the personality 
measures indicated that applicants increased their scores to a greater extent on the scales 
which were most relevant to the job they were applying for.  To illustrate, the effect sizes 
for the sales group in Hypothesis 1 (see Table 3a) were much higher for the extraversion 
and gregariousness scales, which are stereotypically very relevant to sales jobs, indicating 
that sales applicants selectively faked more on these constructs.  This finding corroborates 
Birkeland et al.’s (2006) recent meta-analysis findings, which reported that sales 




 constructs.  The authors attributed this finding to applicants’ perception that extroversion 
is related to success in sales. Conversely, the current study found that manager applicants 
elevated their scores noticeably more on the other two scales: conscientiousness and 
competence.  This resulted in significantly higher scores and effect sizes (.54 for 
conscientiousness and .40 for competence, versus .13 for extraversion and .22 for 
gregariousness), which are shown in Table 3b.  This is interesting, given that Birkeland et 
al. (2006) also hypothesized that managers would inflate their scores more on 
conscientiousness relative to other constructs but their results failed to support this.  This 
study’s findings thus mirror those from earlier research, such as the previously cited study 
by Burkrant (2001), who found that applicants faked more on items that were relevant to 
the job they were applying for.   
These results provide additional evidence that applicants fake in a manner that is 
job-specific.  This growing body of research should be considered when interpreting 
recent conclusions made by authors such as Ellingson et al. (2007), which state that 
applicant faking is a non-significant issue.  This particular study, which isolated the 
average effect due to faking from that of time and feedback, did not examine job type at 
all.  Thus, mean effect sizes in applicant-incumbent score differences were averaged 
across job types.  In addition, the estimated mean effect size due to faking was averaged 
across 20 different CPI personality scales.  Upon further investigation, the effect sizes for 
these scales ranged widely (from less than 0.01 to as much as 0.40 standard deviations) 
depending on the construct measured by the scale.  Given previously mentioned findings 




possible that much larger effect sizes would have been reported by the authors had they 1) 
examined effect sizes for each scale individually and 2) analyzed the data by job type. 
One of the major unique contributions of this study was the use of an alternative 
faking measure in an applied setting.  The sales and manager job desirability scales 
developed for this study expanded upon the type of bogus items that have been used in 
previous research.  First, no previous study had used bogus item measures designed 
specifically for sales and manager positions and administered them in an applied setting.  
Of the bogus item-based measures previously used in applied studies, such as those 
created by Pannone (1984) and Anderson et al. (1984), all have been targeted towards 
lower-level positions, such as electrician and clerical/administrative, respectively.  In 
addition, the two scales in this study were each comprised of 12 bogus items; in 
comparison, Pannone’s (1984) measure consisted of just one item.  This likely contributed 
to the higher reliability values observed for the two scales, ranging from .73 to .77 across 
samples.  The only exception was for the manager incumbent sample, in which values 
ranged from .63 to .65. 
Based on the body of literature discussed earlier, it was expected that applicants 
from each job group would score significantly higher than incumbents on their specific 
job desirability scale, which would have supported Hypothesis 1b.  Indeed this was the 
case for the manager group, in which applicants significantly outscored incumbents by a 
difference of over one-half standard deviations.  Surprisingly, this was not the case for the 
sales group. Sales applicants scored higher than sales incumbents, but this difference was 
not statistically significant.  One would initially conclude from this observation that sales 




premature.  An examination of the mean scores for sales applicants and sales incumbents 
indicates that the lack of significant findings was due more to the surprisingly high mean 
score of sales incumbents (1.98) rather than to a low mean score of sales applicants (2.37).  
In other words, sales incumbents had unexpectedly high scores on the faking measure, 
which resulted in a small mean applicant-incumbent difference.  Sales applicants still 
engaged in faking, but sales incumbents faked as well, thus precluding any significant 
difference in faking scores.  In contrast, manager incumbents had a mean score of only 
1.06 on the manager job desirability scale, compared to their sales applicant counterparts, 
who had a mean score of 2.06.  As shown in Tables 3c and 3d, this resulted in a much 
larger applicant-incumbent effect size for the manager job (0.57) than for the sales job 
(0.18). 
This finding has important implications for applied faking and selection research.  
The first implication is that sales may be a unique position that does not lend itself easily 
to applicant-incumbent comparisons due the nature of the job.  As a result, individuals 
employed in sales positions may have a greater tendency to fake on personality measures 
in comparison to individuals employed in alternative positions that have no sales function.  
Sales roles inherently require a high degree of impression management behavior and 
skills, and success in many types of sales roles is highly dependent on making and 
maintaining a favorable impression. It may be that what some consider faking, lying, or 
dishonesty may simply be seen as putting the best possible foot forward to a salesperson. 
Research would suggest that being high in social desirability may in fact be related to 
strong sales performance.  For example, Ruch and Ruch (1967) found that correcting the 




sample of sales managers.  Moreover, previous research has found that the same 
individual will present him/herself differently when applying for a sales job versus non-
sales jobs (Velicer & Weiner, 1975; Wesman, 1952).  Thus faking research should 
examine the unique response tendencies of sales applicants and further investigate how 
faking affects test validity in this applicant population. 
The second implication is that designs in applied faking research may rely too 
heavily upon the assumption that incumbents do not fake on non-cognitive measures.  An 
overwhelming majority of the existing field studies on faking have used a between-
subjects design that compares applicants to incumbents, such as was used in this study.  
Significant differences, or lack of, in mean scores are then interpreted as evidence that 
applicants fake (or do not fake) in selection settings.  This design is based on the 
assumption that incumbents do not engage in faking simply because they do not have the 
same motivation to elevate their scores as applicants do.  Although this is probably often 
the case, the findings of this study raise some important concerns about this assumption.  
In this study, incumbents from both groups engaged in faking, as indicated by results from 
the one-sample t-tests conducted for Hypothesis 6.  These results indicated that 
incumbents had scores that were significantly higher than zero on the job desirability 
scales, despite the fact that they lacked the same motivation to fake as the applicants 
(improving their chances at being selected for a job they were applying for).  It should be 
noted that incumbents in this study were being assessed for developmental purposes.  
Although they were not being considered for promotional or internal selection purposes, it 
is possible that there was nevertheless some level of motivation to fake in order to 




was present in the incumbents’ response set, this would have resulted in elevated job 
desirability scores for this group.  
Hypothesis 2 replicated previous findings from applied studies that demonstrate 
how individuals who fake can rise to the top of an applicant pool, thereby greatly 
increasing their chances of being selected when a company uses a top-down selection 
strategy (Griffith et al., 2000; Rosse et al., 1998).  At selection ratios of .50 or less, the 
proportion of fakers that would be selected was consistently higher than the proportion of 
fakers in the total sample.  More importantly, the proportion of fakers who would be 
selected linearly increased as the selection ratio became more selective.  This finding 
provides further evidence that faking can create powerful rank-order changes in applicant 
pools which increase the probability that an organization will hire an applicant who 
otherwise would not have been selected.  In light of this, one can call into question the 
conclusions made by Ellingson et al. (2007) and Hogan et al. (2007) which purport that 
applicant faking is minimal and has inconsequential effects on hiring decisions.  Neither 
of these studies examined the effects of faking at the top score percentile ranges - their 
results were based on the full distribution of scores.  However, the results from this study 
and previous research show that applicant faking tends to dramatically increase at the 
higher percentiles of a personality score distribution.  If Ellingson et al. (2007) had 
analyzed applicant-incumbent differences only for those who scored in the top 5 to 25 
percent they may have reported much higher effect sizes even after accounting for time 
and feedback effects.  This issue has even stronger implications for the Hogan et al. 
(2007) study findings because the study examined data only for applicants who were 




were too low.  As a result of this sampling method, the applicants who were most likely to 
fake were inherently excluded from the study.  Thus, it would be erroneous to conclude 
that applicants do not fake based on these findings, especially given previously 
established research confirming that there exist individual differences in faking (e.g., 
McFarland & Ryan, 2000).  Hogan et al.’s (2007) findings likely were based on a limited 
range of applicants who had low ability or propensity to fake because the study 
systematically removed individuals who were more likely to fake (those who were 
successful in their first application attempt).  For example, applicants with higher ability 
or propensity to fake, such as those lower in conscientiousness or locus of control 
(Griffith et al., 2004), would have been systematically removed in Hogan et al.’s (2007) 
study, leading to the conclusion that faking did not occur. 
In addition to the fact that studies such as Ellingson et al. (2007) do not account 
for rank-order changes at the top of the applicant score distribution, they fail to examine 
the role of job type in faking.  As noted earlier, the results of the current study showed 
that applicants inflated their scores most on personality factors that were most relevant to 
the job they were applying for (e.g., sales applicants inflated their scores more on 
extroversion than conscientiousness and vice-versa for manager applicants). As such, it is 
likely that much of the conflicting literature regarding the prevalence of applicant faking 
is due to the lack of attention given to job type.  If applied faking studies examined 
applicant-incumbent or selection-development setting differences and compared them for 
different job types (rather than averaging across all job types), significant faking effects 
likely would be observed.  The current study and studies such as Birkeland et al. (2006) 




investigate the role of job type on whether applicants fake, the extent to which they fake, 
and identify which personality factors they are most likely to fake on given the type of job 
they are applying for.  For example, based on this study’s findings and many previous 
studies (Birkeland et al., 2006; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Wesman, 1952) it is evident that sales 
positions are fairly unique in terms of what personality factors are most likely to be 
emphasized or inflated during the application process. 
The current study also provided a contribution to existing research by replicating 
the applicant “rise to the top” effect (the finding that applicants who fake increase their 
chances of being hired in a top-down selection system based on non-cognitive test scores) 
through the use of an external measure of faking.  As discussed earlier, the studies by 
Rosse et al. (1996) and Zickar et al. (1996) relied on computer simulations of personality 
scores while Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) classified participants as fakers simply based 
upon their assignment to an incentive condition in the study.  Griffith et al. (2000) 
documented this effect simply by examining rank-order changes in the personality scores 
themselves.  The fact that this effect now has been found using both 1) personality scores 
themselves (in student, applicant, and computer simulation samples) and 2) an external 
measure of verifiable faking such as the job desirability measure included in this study 
provides strong evidence that faking disproportionately increases an applicant’s chances 
of being selected when an organization uses non-cognitive measures for hiring purposes 
thereby affecting hiring decisions. 
 Beyond the important questions of whether applicants actually fake and whether 
faking affects hiring decisions, the current study made additional contributions to the 




investigate whether applicant faking patterns are job-specific.  Do applicants fake in 
accordance with the perceived requirements of a specific job?  Results from Hypothesis 3 
and 4 suggest that this is indeed the case.  Between- and within-subject comparisons 
indicated that applicants in each job group had higher scores on the job desirability 
measure that was specifically designed for their job.  In the within-subjects analysis for 
Hypothesis 3, sales applicants had significantly higher scores on the sales scale than on 
the manager scale (using non-parametric tests) whereas manager applicants scored 
significantly higher on the manager scale than on the sales scale.  This shows that when 
presented with bogus experience items for two different jobs, applicants chose to fake 
more on the bogus items that were specific to their job.  Moreover, the between-subjects 
analyses for Hypothesis 4 revealed that sales applicants significantly outscored manager 
applicants on the sales scale and conversely, manager applicants outscored sales 
applicants on the manager scale, although this difference only approached statistical 
significance.  The interpretation from these findings were further supported by results 
from the follow-up ANOVA, which confirmed the presence of a significant statistical 
interaction between job group membership and the version of the job desirability scale 
that participants responded to.  Thus, not only did applicants fake most on bogus items 
relating to their desired job, but they also faked more on these items when compared to 
applicants who sought alternative jobs.  Combined, the findings from Hypotheses 3 and 4 
and the follow-up ANOVA provide strong evidence of job specificity in applicant faking 
patterns. 
 If applicants fake their responses to personality scales in a job-specific manner, 




used in this study, then how much confidence can we hold in personality and non-
cognitive test scores as a whole?  The results of this study provide support both of these 
statements, and they have broad implications for the interpretation of these measures in a 
selection context.  If applicants manipulate selection test items and succeed in creating 
profiles that are ideal for the specific job they are seeking, then the validity and utility of 
such items could be greatly reduced.  In such a case, responses to non-cognitive measures 
could be considered to be entirely situation-specific such that individuals’ responses 
would vary greatly depending on the testing situation.  Such situation specificity in 
response patterns could be attributed to faking.  However, an alternative explanation could 
be that applicants describe themselves in a more favorable light when they consider 
themselves in a work-related context.  In other words, they may describe their behavior as 
more conscientious, for example, when they are at work versus when they are at home.  
Markus and Wurf’s (1987) describe a body of research showing that individuals have a 
dynamic “working self-concept” that is multi-faceted, can change over time varies by 
context.  Lord and Brown (2004), as cited recently by Johnson and Chang (2008), go 
further by stating that “in work contexts, phenomena such as leader behaviors, 
interpersonal interactions, and the work itself are capable of eliciting a particular working 
self-concept.”  Moreover, individuals can display an average, or general, self-concept over 
time (Johnson & Chang, 2008).  Hence, it is plausible that individuals can have an honest 
view of their personality that differs significantly depending on whether the context is in 
or outside of work.  As applicants likely consider themselves from an “at work” context 
when they respond to non-cognitive measures, such as those used in this study, it is 




described their personality at work (rather than outside of work).  Whether or not this 
could be extended to their responses on the job desirability questions, which are much 
more biographical and verifiable in nature, is less likely, however. 
Further research should investigate more closely how various factors related to the 
applicant setting (job requirements, how attractive the job is) and the applicant him/herself 
(personality traits, motivation to obtain a specific job) can elicit, modify, or even create a 
work-specific self-concept when applicants apply for a specific job.  This dynamic self-
concept, in turn, likely has important effects on job-specific faking behavior and more 
broadly, on individual differences in faking.  Such a line of research would provide 
valuable insight into the faking processes used across different job application settings, 
and help identify the most effective ways to address each situation. 
 Hypothesis 5 was aimed at further investigating the nature of faking as a construct.  
It sought to clarify previous findings regarding the relationship between observed faking 
behavior and the impression management and self-deception sub-factors of social 
desirability (Carroll et al., 2004, Griffith et al., 2004).  Unexpected findings emerged from 
these analyses.  Contrary to expectations, self-deception correlated more with job 
desirability scores (i.e., faking behavior) than impression management.  This difference 
was more pronounced for the sales group (.21 versus .12) than for the manager group (.35 
versus .30).  Carroll et al. (2004) found moderate correlations between impression 
management and their measure of job desirability but found negligible correlations 
between self-deception and job desirability.  In the current study, however, job desirability 




leads one to the conclusion that the faking exhibited may be more subtle, and be more 
akin to putting one’s best foot forward rather than faking as much as possible. 
 Important implications arise from these findings.  It was argued earlier that faking 
constitutes deliberate deception or misrepresentation of oneself, which is more similar to 
the impression management aspect of social desirability, whereas the self-deception 
aspect involves a more subconscious and unintentional form of misrepresentation.  Based 
on this premise, a measure of deliberate faking such as the job desirability scales used in 
this study should correlate with impression management but should not correlate with 
self-deception.  Contrary to this, the findings from Hypothesis 5 suggest that perhaps 
faking on the job desirability measures was somewhat subconscious in nature.  As such, it 
should be noted that some researchers argue that impression management actually is the 
sign of a psychologically healthy person and that it is nearly impossible to distinguish 
faking from normal, “socialized” behavior because in everyday life, people are reinforced 
by society to make a favorable impression of themselves (Hogan et al., 2007; Hogan & 
Nicholson, 1998). 
An examination of the inter-correlations between the study variables reveals 
interesting findings.  Social desirability correlated very strongly with conscientiousness 
and competence (r’s ranging from .37 to .46 in the full sample), suggesting a strong 
relationship to true personality for both the impression management and self-deception 
sub-factors.  In contrast, job desirability had a much weaker relationship with these two 
personality scales, with correlations ranging from only .11 to .15.  Thus the job 
desirability measures measured variance that was distinct from conscientiousness (and 




findings were different, however.  Social desirability correlated only in the .17 to .38 
range with these personality scales in the full sample.  These correlations were very 
similar to the correlations that job desirability displayed with extroversion and 
competence (.17 to .30), indicating that job desirability did tap the extroversion construct 
to some extent – primarily in the sales group.  Thus, job desirability successfully measures 
variance that is unique from personality, but this depends on the particular personality 
factor being considered, and possibly on the type of job applicants are applying for.   
 Although the positive correlation observed between self-deception and job 
desirability was unexpectedly significant, this finding should be interpreted within a broad 
perspective.  The fact remains that all the correlations between job desirability and both 
the social desirability factors were statistically significant yet relatively small in 
magnitude.  Although these correlations were not completely negligible, as in the case of 
Carroll et al. (2004), none of the correlations between job desirability, impression 
management, and self-deception exceeded a value of .35 in the sales and manager 
applicant samples, indicating that job desirability measured variance that is distinct from 
either social desirability factor.  Stated another way, the maximum variance in job 
desirability scores that was accounted for by social desirability was only 12% based on 
the co-efficient of determination.  Hence, job desirability measured variance that was 
unique from both personality (extroversion or conscientiousness) and social desirability 
(impression management or self-deception factors).  It is thus a useful faking measure 
because 1) it is not closely tied to true personality score variance, which would unfairly 




social desirability, which as discussed earlier, often has been ineffective in efforts to 
identify faking and minimize its potentially detrimental effects on validity. 
 Having established that job desirability taps unique variance that is unique from 
self-deception and impression management, an important question then becomes:  which 
of these constructs is most useful in the detection of applicant faking?  In examining the 
difference scores between applicants and incumbents on the social desirability and job 
desirability measures (see Tables 3c and 3d) it is evident that the job desirability measure 
was more sensitive to applicant-incumbent differences than the impression management 
measure.  In the sales group, the job desirability d value was .18 standard deviations 
compared to only .04 standard deviations for impression management.  Although the 
difference of .18 for job desirability was relatively small and was not statistically 
significant, it was over four times more sensitive than impression management.  In the 
manager group, the same pattern of results emerged, although both scales were more 
sensitive.  The manager job desirability scale d value was .57 standard deviations 
compared to only .28 standard deviations for impression management.  This finding 
indicates that job desirability was highly sensitive to manager applicant-incumbent 
differences, as it represents an effect size of over one half standard deviations, and again 
shows that it is more sensitive to faking than impression management.  In the case of 
managers, it was twice as sensitive as impression management. 
 Given the fact that impression management scales have been by far the most 
widely used faking measures in both laboratory and field studies alike, this is a finding of 
great consequence.  If the consulting companies who provided data for this study had used 




have resulted from using the impression management scale in the sales group, as 
applicants scored only .04 standard deviations higher than incumbents.  This represents 
essentially no difference between applicants and incumbents.  As for the manager group, 
some value would have resulted (slightly over one quarter standard deviations difference) 
but it would have been trivial in comparison with the potential value of the job desirability 
scale, which exhibited twice the magnitude in effect size across applicants and 
incumbents.  The impression management scale included in this study is one of the most 
widely researched instruments used to measure faking, which is alarming, given its low 
sensitivity to applicant-incumbent differences in the current study.  By comparison, the 
job desirability measure developed for this study proved to be much more valuable in 
detecting applicant faking for both sales and manager jobs. 
 What is even more surprising about the small effect sizes found for the impression 
management scale is the fact that the self-deception scale actually displayed consistently 
higher effect sizes.  For the sales group, the self-deception d value was .22 (.04 for 
impression management) and for the manager group, the self deception d value was .41 
(.28 for impression management).  Based on Paulhus’ (1991) definition of self-deception 
as a subconscious misrepresentation of oneself that is linked to one’s true personality, one 
would conclude from these results that applicant-incumbent differences do not reflect a 
conscious effort to fake; rather they are indicative of unconscious and unintentional 
tendency to represent oneself in a favorable light.  However, the sales job desirability 
effect size was almost as large as the self-deception effect size while the manager job 
desirability effect size was double the size of the self-deception effect size.  The items in 




responding “yes” to these items should involve a higher level of deliberate falsification in 
comparison to elevating one’s score on the self-deception scale items.  Thus, the observed 
applicant-incumbent differences could be attributed to deliberate deception based on the 
job desirability effect sizes, yet also attributed to unconscious misrepresentation based on 
the self-deception effect sizes, particularly for the sales group. 
Further research is needed to understand these findings more clearly.  One 
interpretation could be that faking is largely deliberate, and that applicants elevate their 
scores on the self-deception items consciously, rather than subconsciously.  Alternatively, 
any elevation in applicant scores could be interpreted as an unconscious aspect of true 
personality, and as such, endorsement of job desirability items would be considered as 
unintentional.  An example of this would be an applicant who indicated having a non-
existent skill not because of a conscious effort to fake, but rather because the skill 
sounded like something they had learned in the past and appeared to be job-relevant.  
Perhaps subconsciously, the desire to be selected for a job would cause such an applicant 
to claim having experience with this skill even though they were not fully certain about 
this claim.  
However, a third interpretation seems more plausible.  Observed applicant-
incumbent differences likely constitute both conscious and subconscious processes that 
result in some combination of deliberate deception and unintentional misrepresentation 
that ultimately raises applicant scores above typical incumbent score ranges.  The 
correlations between personality, impression management, self-deception, and job 
desirability indicated applicant personality scores shared at least some variance with all 




that applicants engage in both deliberate and unintentional faking, and in a manner that 
can be either specific or non-specific to a given job.  As noted previously, research has 
shown that there are individual differences in faking (Griffith et al., 2004; McFarland & 
Ryan, 2000).  Thus applicants could vary widely in terms of 1) whether they engage in 
unconscious or deliberate faking behavior, and 2) whether they engage is some 
combination of the two. 
 The effect sizes found for the personality measures in this study were somewhat 
smaller than those found in previous research. In their meta-analysis of faking effect size 
estimates, Viswesvaran & Ones (1999) reported that the average faking effect size in 
simulated faking studies ranged from .48 to .65 standard deviations for Big Five 
personality measures.  Within-subject faking simulations tended to result in higher effect 
sizes, ranging from .47 to .93.  Zickar & Robie (1999) provided more accurate estimates 
using IRT methodology, which produced faking effect sizes that ranged from .63 to .82 
under general instructions to fake but from .93 to 1.51 when participants were coached on 
how to fake.  In line with these findings, an earlier study conducted by the author found 
that effect sizes for within-subject differences on a measure of the Big Five personality 
factors ranged from .34 to as high as 1.17 when  comparing responses under instructions 
to fake versus instructions to respond honestly. 
As shown in Tables 3a and 3b, the d values for the four personality scales used in 
this study were somewhat lower, ranging only from .27 to .54.  These findings are in line 
with those reported by Birkeland et al.  (2006), who found that applicant-incumbent effect 
sizes in applied settings ranged from .11 to .45 depending on the Big Five scale in 




settings, applicants do tend to score significantly higher than applicants, but they do not 
fake as much as individuals who are instructed to fake in a laboratory setting.  Some 
researchers (Birkeland et al., 2006; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) have attributed this 
discrepancy between applied and laboratory faking behavior to the fact that instructions to 
fake induce a level of faking that is artificially high whereas faking in selection settings is 
not induced or manipulated by an experimenter; rather it is a decision taken on the part of 
applicants, who likely differ in their motivation and intent to fake.  Applicants are also 
subject to the possibility that they could be punished for faking by being removed from 
consideration for the job they seek.  In fact, many assessments in use today display some 
sort of warning or statement that either discourages dishonest responding or clearly states 
that individuals who respond dishonestly will not be considered for a position with the 
company.  In light of this, it is little wonder that applicants do not inflate their scores to 
the extent that is usually observed in laboratory settings where participants are asked to 
fake as if they are an applicant, or to enhance their resulting profile as much as possible.  
Thus the findings of this study further confirm that applicants do not elevate their scores 
to the maximum extent possible but rather raise their scores in a more subtle manner, and 
as shown by the correlations between personality, job desirability and self-deception, they 
may do so in both conscious and unconscious ways. 
 If applicants do not fake as much as laboratory participants, however, is it possible 
to accurately and reliably identify applicants who do fake?  And if so, what is the best 
method to use?  Findings from this study support the use of a job desirability measure for 
this purpose.  The job desirability scale was clearly the most sensitive to applicant-




manager job desirability scale exhibited an effect size that was twice as large as the effect 
size for impression management.  In addition, it was larger than the effect size for the self-
deception measure.  This supports previous findings by Miller & Tristan (2002) that job 
desirability measures are more sensitive to faking than social desirability measures in a 
laboratory setting under instructions to fake versus to respond honestly.   Taken together, 
these studies provide both laboratory- and field-based support for the use of job 
desirability as opposed to social desirability as a method for identifying fakers, at least for 
managerial selection. 
 As for sales selection, the results of this study are not as conclusive, based on the 
fact that job desirability did not exhibit as high an effect size as it did for managers.  
However, the effect size of .18 was nonetheless higher than the .04 effect size for 
impression management, indicating again that the job desirability measure was more 
sensitive to faking than impression management.  However, the sales job desirability 
effect size was much smaller in comparison with the manager job desirability effect size, 
and was also somewhat smaller than the self-deception effect size of .22.  Thus, in the 
case of sales, job desirability would be more effective than impression management in 
terms of identifying fakers but not necessarily more effective than a self-deception scale. 
 Yet the results of the Hypothesis 6 analyses first must be considered before this 
conclusion is made.  Hypothesis 6 was aimed at assessing whether incumbents scored 
significantly higher than zero on the job desirability measures.  Mean scores that were 
significantly above zero would indicate that the faking measure could be incorrectly 
identifying participants as fakers.  Stated differently, this finding could indicate that the 




fakers who in actuality were honest and mistakenly endorsed bogus job experience items 
due to confusion or error (not due to dishonesty).  Hypothesis 6 thus predicted that 
incumbents would not score significantly higher than zero on the job desirability scales, 
whereas applicants would score higher.  Contrary to expectations, incumbents did score 
significantly higher than zero, although the effect size was not as large as it was for 
applicants.  As discussed earlier in this section, one must consider the hypothesis that 
incumbents actually faked as well, rather than simply assume that they confused the bogus 
experience qualifications with ones that sounded similar to those which they actually did 
possess.  Incumbents scored significantly higher than zero in both positions, although 
much more so in the case of sales.  Put in perspective, the sales incumbent mean score 
(1.98) was nearly double that of manager incumbents (1.06).  This unexpected high mean 
score for sales incumbents contributed to a non-significant mean score difference when it 
was compared to the sales applicant mean score (2.37). 
Based on such high job desirability scores for sales incumbents, one could argue 
that the instrument did not necessarily result in a high rate of false positives, but rather 
that the incumbents in this job group engaged in faking even though they had little 
motivation to do so.  As a consequence, it is premature to conclude that the job 
desirability measure was ineffective in identifying sales applicants who faked, or that it 
was less effective than the self-deception measure.  It is likely that special attention must 
be given to faking measures designed for this particular job applicant population due to 
the nature of typical sales job requirements.  Circumstances may dictate that if a job 
desirability measure is used with this population, specialized norms should be developed 




identify only unusually high scoring individuals as fakers.  In Hypothesis 2 of this study, a 
95th percentile on the job desirability scales was used as the cutoff point to classify 
applicants as fakers.  Based on this, only sales applicants with a score of 7 or higher were 
labeled as fakers whilst only manager applicants with a score of 6 or higher were labeled 
as fakers.  A strategy such as this, which identified only extreme forms of faking on the 
job desirability measures, may be the most appropriate method for identifying fakers 
using bogus items. 
From a standpoint of practicality and legal defensibility, this approach would be 
beneficial because it would provide a highly objective and verifiable means by which to 
classify someone as a faker; only those whom endorsed an abnormally high number of 
items would be flagged as dishonest applicants.  In turn, a hiring organization could then 
more closely examine the hiring data for these individuals, or simply remove them from 
the hiring process based on deliberate falsification during the hiring process.  More 
research on similar job desirability measures is needed in applicant settings to determine 
the ideal cutoff point at which an applicant can be reliably and accurately considered to be 
faking on job experience questions versus simply confusing bogus items with actual 
qualifications.  Nevertheless, the results from this study provide a promising basis from 
which to extend this line of research further, and they provide a highly useful baseline 
estimate of how much applicants would fake on a bogus item faking measure under real 
selection conditions. 
The last hypothesis examined in this study was Hypothesis 7, which predicted that 
years of job experience in a similar job would be significantly and positively correlated 




however; there was no significant relationship between the job experience and job 
desirability scores in the manager group.  This result is interesting in that job type could 
possibly mediate the relationship between job experience and faking.  Specifically, sales 
applicants who were more experienced tended to fake more than less experienced sales 
applicants.  For managers, however, there was no observed relationship between 
experience and faking. 
One possible explanation for this effect could be that salespeople over time become 
more and more desensitized to embellishing the truth or being dishonest about personal 
experiences because they become accustomed to doing so in their day-to-day interactions 
with their contacts from prospect companies.  This is plausible given that in order to be 
successful, salespeople must often seek to forge a common bond with prospects 
immediately during sales interactions.  In order to accomplish this, a salesperson often 
engages in friendly conversation regarding various subject matters.  In order to facilitate 
an interaction and increase chances of success during a sales call or meeting, a salesperson 
might claim to be knowledgeable about anything that their contact would ask about or 
mention even if they in fact lack knowledge about it.  Over time, this process would 
condition a salesperson to become accustomed to this behavior and perceive it as 
increasingly acceptable.  Ultimately, those with more years of sales experience might fake 
to a greater extent on selection measures simply because this behavior has become 
conditioned over time during their sales interactions.  Further research should investigate 
the degree to which previous job experience correlates with faking behavior, and the 
degree to which experience in a specific type of job could lead to more job-specific 




Limitations of the Current Study 
 Field versus Laboratory Setting.  As with any piece of research, there were many 
limitations to the current study.  Due to the fact that this was a field study, an initial 
limitation was the loss of experimental control that one would normally have in a 
laboratory setting.  As a result, it was not possible to control certain critical variables such 
as participant selection, administration, test motivation, and faking behavior.  Participants 
were actual job applicants and employees who underwent the assessments administered 
by each of the two aforementioned consulting firms.  Hence it was not possible to 
randomly assign participants to different conditions (employment status and job type) of 
the study.  This aspect of the design also precluded the level of control over the 
administration of all questionnaires.  Although all participants were given the same 
instructions immediately before they began the questionnaires for this study, there was no 
control over the instructions that participants were given at the beginning of the consulting 
firms’ assessments.  Each consulting firm’s assessment was administered first, and each 
began with its own assessment instructions.  Upon completing the firm’s assessments, 
participants then were directed immediately to the section containing the measures for this 
study, which commenced with their own set of instructions.  Therefore, there were some 
differences in the instructions and the assessments that participants completed depending 
on which firm they participated through.  These differences would have had a limited 
effect if any, however, because the second firm provided assessment data for only a small 
subset of the sample, a portion of the sales incumbent sample.  Consequently, this firm 




It should be noted that the instructions of both consulting firms and the 
instructions at the start of this study’s questionnaires included a brief warning to respond 
as honestly as possible (see Appendix D).  None of these warnings actually warned of 
possible repercussions that participants might face if they were identified as fakers, 
however.  For example, both the consulting firms’ warnings simply instructed participants 
that they should respond as honestly as possible and suggested that they respond to items 
based on their initial reaction or impulse rather than try to think about what the most 
appropriate response might be.  The only significant difference between the two firm’s 
warning statements is that the primary firm which provided most of the data went further 
by indicating that their assessment included validity scales which could detect faking.  No 
reference was ever made to what could happen if a participant was actually identified as 
having responded dishonestly. These two sets of instructions were fairly consistent with 
those used for the questionnaire in this study, which also asked participants to describe 
themselves as honestly as possible.  Thus, in spite of the fact that participants had to view 
different instructions that were outside of the scope of this study because of the firms’ 
assessment processes, all of these instruction sets were fairly consistent in nature and all 
included a succinct recommendation to respond honestly. 
An issue that could be of greater concern is whether the warnings included in all of 
the instructions affected participants likelihood and extent of faking on all the measures in 
this study.  Research has shown warnings can reduce the extent to which individuals fake 
(Dwight & Donovan, 2003).  As such, it is possible that the subtle warnings described 
here may have suppressed faking levels to some extent.  However, this concern is 




(despite slight differences in their wording).  Moreover, many psychometric instruments 
used today for selection and development purposes usually include some form of faking 
warning to test takers, thus the warnings included here simply provided participants with a 
highly realistic assessment experience which they would likely encounter in any other 
hiring or employee development scenario.  Ultimately this makes the results of this study 
more replicable in other field settings. 
Another limitation that resulted from the field setting aspect of this study was the 
lack of control over the actual testing conditions experienced by each participant.  
Participants completed the assessment on their own time in the location of their choice, 
thus introducing unwanted variability into the test setting.  This could have affected scores 
to the extent that participants were distracted or to the extent that they experienced any 
technical difficulties (e.g., internet connection loss, issues with computer performance) or 
took pauses during the assessment itself. 
Testing motivation also was outside the control of this study.  As such it was 
impossible to induce a controlled motivation to fake or respond honestly, as is the case in 
most laboratory-based faking studies.  This could introduce potential unwanted variability 
in personality and faking scores because individuals likely varied in their motivation to 
create a desirable or job-specific impression.  Given that the overall goal of faking 
research ultimately lies in finding the best way to address applicant faking in actual 
selection settings, however, this limitation also serves as one of the principal strengths of 
this study: the fact that it was carried out in a real selection setting where motivation to 
fake did not need to be manipulated.  An essential premise of faking research is that an 




one being hired for a job.  All extant personality faking research is based on this premise 
(although there debate about whether this actually results in deliberate deception or 
unwanted variance in personality scores).  Therefore, it follows that applicants in this 
study should have been motivated to score as highly as possible on the measures they 
completed and that this motivation was an inherent part of the applicant condition in this 
study.  Whether or not the incumbent participants in this study felt little motivation to fake 
is a different matter which was addressed earlier in this section.  Mean score levels for 
incumbents on the job desirability scales indicated that they may have engaged in some 
level of faking, although to a lesser extent than the applicants. 
Lastly, a related limitation due to the field setting in this study was the lack of 
control over faking behavior itself.  It was not possible to manipulate the extent to which 
individuals actually increased their scores or the pattern of their responses. With regards 
to the extent of faking, the results replicated various earlier studies which report that 
applicants tend to score anywhere between .10 and .50 standard deviations higher than 
incumbents (Birkeland et al., 2006).  Thus it can be concluded that applicants faked their 
responses to a level that was expected.  As for the pattern of their responses, this was not 
controllable either.  For example, laboratory studies such as those by Miller and Tristan 
(2002) and Raymark et al. (2004) manipulated the type of job that participants were 
instructed to fake their responses for.  This enabled the authors to test whether faking 
could be job-specific in nature on personality and faking measures.  Although the field 
setting did not allow this level of experimental control, results still suggested that faking 
in an applied setting is to some extent job-specific, as evidenced by differences on the 




effect sizes across job types.  This provided a much needed test of job-specific faking 
evidence in a field setting.  The resulting findings provide complimentary support to 
previous laboratory research findings, thus lending increasing evidence that applicants 
fake with a specific type of job in mind, and that this affects the way in which they 
respond to non-cognitive psychometric measures. 
Non-normal Distribution of Data.  One of the challenges in the analysis was the non-
normal distribution of the data.  As described in the Results section, data for all 
personality scores was skewed and was indicative of kurtosis, thereby making it difficult 
to interpret results from parametric statistical tests, which are based on the assumption of 
normally distributed data.  Violations of normality could result in underestimates of true 
relationships between variables, indicating that many of the correlations and mean score 
comparisons reported could be underestimates.  To counter this limitation, non-parametric 
versions of all tests were conducted.  These resulted in very similar findings for all 
analyses, thereby confirming results from the parametric tests and mitigating concerns 
about unwanted effects of non-normally distributed data on the interpretations made in 
this study.  Due to the effect that faking tends to have on personality scores (skewed 
distributions, possible ceiling effects, etc.), further research should investigate new ways 
to address the challenges of non-normally distributed data that is often exhibited in both 
applied and laboratory faking studies. 
 Lastly, it should be mentioned that the design of this study unfortunately did not 
allow for the collection of performance data for the participants.  Hence it was not 
possible to address one of the most critical of all questions in the faking literature: 




measures.  Ultimately, faking researchers must seek an answer to this important question.  
If faking does not truly attenuate validity or adversely affect hiring decisions, it is of 
limited value as an area of research within Industrial/Organizational Psychology.  It is not 
possible to assess whether those individuals who were identified as fakers in this study 
ultimately would have been poor performers or would have engaged in any 
counterproductive behaviors in an organization that might have hired them.  As discussed 
in the literature review, research is inconclusive regarding this critical question.  However, 
it can be said with certainty from the results of this study that applicants who faked on the 
job desirability measure did highly increase their chances of being hired based on 
personality scores in a top-down selection system because they were disproportionately 
represented at the top range of the applicant distribution.  As the results for Hypothesis 2 
indicated, the probability of a faker being selected increased linearly as the selection ratio 
became more selective.  And although it cannot be said with certainty whether those who 
endorse bogus items are more likely to be poor performers, previous findings in applied 
settings by Pannone (1984) and Anderson et al. (1984) indicate that they indeed would be 
poor performers relative to those who answered these items honestly.  Laboratory-based 
findings such as those reported by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) and Douglas et al. (1996) 
also support this hypothesis, which leads one to believe that the applicants classified as 
fakers in this study had a greater chance of being unsuccessful hires relative to other 
applicants. 
Beyond the question of whether faking decays the criterion-related validity of a 
personality assessment, other practical and ethical implications would arise if an 




scale used in this study.  For instance, would an organization truly want to hire an 
individual who claimed to have several qualifications that were non-existent?  Is there a 
meaningful difference between responding “yes” to one of the bogus items included in the 
current study and providing false information on an employment application or a résumé?  
In essence, the bogus qualifications that comprise the job desirability measures in this 
study can be likened easily to work-related qualifications such as a high school diploma, a 
training certificate, or previous experience performing any essential job skill.  Any 
individual who has completed a job application in the United States within the past 20 
years likely has encountered some form of formal disclaimer on that application stating 
not only that they could be disqualified from the hiring process if they supplied false 
information, but that their employment could be terminated at any point if the company 
was to discover that their application included false information.  If companies have 
deemed it so unanimously unacceptable to allow false information on an employment 
application, falsification on a bogus job experience questionnaire (used as part of a 
selection process) should not be treated any differently. 
Moreover, in this study, applicants were only classified as fakers if they had 
responded “yes” to 7 or more items in the sales group and 6 or more items in the manager 
group.  In contrast, the Pannone (1984) study classified applicants as fakers if they 
endorsed only one item.  The possibility of falsely classifying someone as a faker would 
have been much higher in that study, whereas in the current study, a rejection decision 
could be made with a much greater level of confidence because only extreme levels of 
faking on a verifiable faking measure would constitute faking.  In other words, one would 




have experience with six bogus qualifications versus only 1 because there would be a 
much lower probability that they had made six “honest” mistakes on their job application 
as opposed to making just one honest mistake.  Thus, a hiring organization could benefit 
from using a job desirability measure such as the one used in this study.  It would not only 
offer a viable alternative to traditional social desirability measures due to its lower 
correlations with personality variance but it would also provide a more verifiable and 
objective means of identifying dishonest individuals based on the fact that they had 
supplied false information during the application process. 
Summary 
The results of this study highlight the need for both researchers and practitioners 
alike to move beyond the use of social desirability scales as a measure of faking.  This 
study confirmed what various faking studies have reported in the past – applicants fake 
their responses to non-cognitive tests in hiring situations. As previous research also has 
shown, there are rewards to this test taking approach; applicants who faked systematically 
increased their chances of being hired over non-fakers in a top-down selection system 
based on personality scores.  More importantly, however, the findings from this study 
expanded upon the extant faking literature by testing an alternative measure of faking – a 
job desirability scale – in an applied setting.  By comparing real sales and manager 
applicants’ scores on both versions of the job desirability scale and on multiple 
personality scales, it was possible to show that applicants fake in a job-specific manner by 
claiming to have job experience and personality traits that appear to be job relevant.  Thus 




constructs, as opposed to faking to the same extent on all items regardless of what 
construct they measure. 
The current study also has implications for designs in applied faking research.  
Incumbent scores on the job desirability scales indicated that employees fake on non-
cognitive measures at least to some extent, and particularly in sales jobs.  Decades of 
applied faking research has made the assumption that incumbent scores represent honest 
scores.  However, the results from this study suggest that this assumption may be faulty, 
and that careful scrutiny should be given when interpreting differences between applicant 
and incumbent scores on non-cognitive test scores.  Moreover, the findings from this 
study suggest that in the case of sales jobs, applicant and incumbent scores may closely 
parallel each other. 
Finally, the current study advances the understanding of faking and its relationship 
to social desirability.  Results showed that although job desirability and social desirability 
were significantly correlated with each other, these correlations were generally small to 
moderate in size and were likely significant simply due to the large sample size.  
Therefore, it was shown that faking should not be synonymous with social desirability.  
Moreover, impression management displayed a smaller correlation with job desirability 
than self deception.  This contradicts the theory that impression management scores 
constitute deliberate faking more so than do self-deception scores.  Results suggest rather 
that faking variance reflects both overt/conscious and subtle/subconscious aspects of 
deception, in addition to variance from other constructs which are likely unaccounted for 




body of research on applicant faking and have wide implications for theory and practice 





Demographic Frequencies for Study Sample Only 
 
Category Number Percentage
Gender   
   Female 360 37.6 
   Male 
   Unknown 
570 
  28 
59.5 
  2.9 
Race   
   African-American   93   9.7 
   Asian/Pacific Islander     7   0.7 
   Caucasian   677 70.7 
   Hispanic   52   5.4 
   Native American 
   Other 
   6 
   3 
  0.6 
  0.3 
   Unknown 120 12.5 
Job Type   
   Sales 762 79.5 
   Manager 196 20.5 
Job Type by Employment Status   
   Sales Applicant 632 66.0 
   Sales Incumbent 
   Manager Applicant 
   Manager Incumbent 
130 
112 
  84 
13.5 
11.7 
  8.8 
Years Experience in Similar Job   
   0 118 12.3 
   1 or less 
   2-5 
   6-9 
   10 or more 
















Demographic Frequencies for All Participants 
 
Category Number Percentage
Gender   
   Female 782 43.9 
   Male 




  4.4 
Race   
   African-American 224 12.6 
   Asian/Pacific Islander 143   8.0 
   Caucasian     1071 60.2 
   Hispanic 112   6.3 
   Native American 
   Other 
  10 
  15 
  0.6 
  0.8 
   Unknown     205       11.5 
Job Type   
   Sales 762 42.8 
   Manager 
   Professional/Technical 
   Sales Manager 
   Customer Service 
   Administrative 




  62  
  35 
433 
11.0 
  8.3 
  8.1 
  3.5 
  2.0 
24.3 
Job Type by Employment Status   
   Sales Applicant 632 35.5 
   Sales Incumbent 
   Manager Applicant 
   Manager Incumbent 
130 
112 
  84 
  7.3 
  6.3 
  4.7 
Years Experience in Similar Job   
   0 259 14.6 
   1 or less 
   2-5 
   6-9 
   10 or more 
























                  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables – Full Sample 
 




  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
 1. Conscientiousness 46.26 3.77 (.78)        
 2. Extraversion 42.43 5.17 .45** (.80)       
 3. Competence 46.44 3.82 .82** .51** (.79)      
 4. Gregariousness 41.21 5.69 .39** .94** .45** (.82)     
 5. Impression Management 12.15 4.35 .41** .20** .37** .17** (.83)    
 6. Self-Deception 11.12 4.01 .46** .38** .45** .36** .60** (.77)   
 7. Job Desirability Sales    2.23 2.29 .15** .27** .14** .30** .12** .24** (.75)  
 8. Job Desirability Manager   1.64 2.05 .13** .17** .11** .18** .12** .20** .63** (.75) 




        Table 2b 
          Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables – Sales Applicants and Incumbents 
 
         Note: N =  683. *p < .05. **p < .01. SD = Standard Deviation.  
 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
 1. Conscientiousness 46.41 3.73 (.79)        
 2. Extraversion 43.37 4.79 .46** (.80)       
 3. Competence 46.62 3.68 .81** .55** (.78)      
 4. Gregariousness 42.46 5.21 .40** .94** .49** (.81)     
 5. Impression Management 12.00 4.24 .39** .19** .33** .18** (.82)    
 6. Self-Deception 11.40 3.78 .44** .37** .44** .37** .57** (.75)   
 7. Job Desirability Sales    2.30 2.26 .12** .19** .10** .19** .13** .23** (.74)  
 8. Job Desirability Manager   1.51 1.95 .12** .13** .10** .12** .08** .15** .63** (.74) 






 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables – Manager Applicants and Incumbents 
 
Note: N =  196. *p < .05. **p < .01. SD = Standard Deviation.  
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
 1. Conscientiousness 45.93 3.58 (.75)        
 2. Extraversion 41.60 5.38 .38** (.83)       
 3. Competence 46.56 3.47 .79** .42** (.78)      
 4. Gregariousness 39.98 5.88 .32** .95** .38** (.84)     
 5. Impression Management 11.69 4.29 .40**   .18* .34** .17* (.83)    
 6. Self-Deception 10.09 3.96 .43** .30** .44** .28** .57** (.77)   
 7. Job Desirability Sales    1.91 2.07 .21** .31** .17* .33** .23** .29** (.73)  
 8. Job Desirability Manager   1.65 1.97   .17* .15* .18* .15* .26** .31** .61** (.73) 




         Table 2d 
          Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables – Sales Applicants 
 
         Note: N =  632. *p < .05. **p < .01. SD = Standard Deviation.  
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
 1. Conscientiousness 46.50 3.57 (.77)        
 2. Extraversion 43.54 4.64 .45** (.79)       
 3. Competence 46.71 3.58 .81** .53** (.78)      
 4. Gregariousness 42.61 5.10 .39** .94** .47** (.81)     
 5. Impression Management 12.01 4.26 .39**   .18** .33** .17* (.83)    
 6. Self-Deception 11.46 3.75 .45** .37** .45** .38** .60** (.74)   
 7. Job Desirability Sales    2.37 2.28 .10* .18**   .10* .18** .12** .21** (.74)  
 8. Job Desirability Manager   1.51 1.95   .11**   .14*   .09* .13* .10* .16** .63** (.74) 




         Table 2e 
          Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables – Manager Applicants 
 
         Note: N =  112. *p < .05. **p < .01. SD = Standard Deviation.  
 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
 1. Conscientiousness 46.75 3.09 (.73)        
 2. Extraversion 41.89 5.26 .40** (.83)       
 3. Competence 47.14 2.73 .76** .48** (.68)      
 4. Gregariousness 40.54 5.69 .34** .94** .43** (.84)     
 5. Impression Management 12.20 4.51 .39**   .22* .35**     .24* (.86)    
 6. Self-Deception 10.78 3.90 .38** .37** .35** .36** .56** (.77)   
 7. Job Desirability Sales    1.94 2.24 .23* .33**   .28** .35** .33** .33** (.77)  
 8. Job Desirability Manager   2.10 2.19   .16*   .27*   .22* .26** .30** .35** .68** (.73) 




          Table 2f 
           Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables – Sales Incumbents 
 
         Note: N = 51 except for JD Sales (N = 130). *p < .05. **p < .01. SD = Standard Deviation.  
 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
 1. Conscientiousness 45.29 5.29 (.89)        
 2. Extraversion 41.31 6.10 .52** (.84)       
 3. Competence 45.55 4.69 .81** .67** (.83)      
 4. Gregariousness 40.55 6.13 .46** .95**  .61** (.84)     
 5. Impression Management 11.84 4.03 .46**   .28*   .35*     .31* (.79)    
 6. Self-Deception 10.61 4.09 .40**   .29*   .32*     .27 .66** (.78)   
 7. Job Desirability Sales    1.98 2.13   .19   .28*   .12     .25    .21 .44** (.74)  
 8. Job Desirability Manager   1.45 1.92   .20   .04   .16     .03   -.15   .09 .57** (.74) 




           Table 2g 
            Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables – Manager Incumbents 
 
         Note: N =  84. *p < .05. **p < .01. SD = Standard Deviation.  
 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
 1. Conscientiousness 44.85 3.91 (.74)        
 2. Extraversion 41.20 5.54 .36** (.83)       
 3. Competence 45.77 4.16 .80** .38** (.84)      
 4. Gregariousness 39.25 6.08   .27* .95**  .32** (.83)     
 5. Impression Management 11.02 3.90 .38**   .09   .31**     .04 (.78)    
 6. Self-Deception   9.18 3.86 .42**   .20   .50**     .16 .56** (.76)   
 7. Job Desirability Sales    1.87 1.85   .20   .29**   .08     .30**    .06   .22* (.65)  
 8. Job Desirability Manager   1.06 1.44   .05  -.11   .06    -.09    .09   .12 .51** (.63) 






Differences Between Applicant and Incumbent Personality Scores for Sales Job. 
 
      Applicant 
 







































43.54 4.64 41.31 6.10 3.21** -2.38* .42 
Competence 
 
46.71 3.58 45.55 4.69 2.17* -1.82 .28 
Gregariousness 
 
42.61 5.10 40.55 6.13 2.73** -2.20* .37 







Differences Between Applicant and Incumbent Personality Scores for Manager Job. 
 
      Applicant 
 





































41.89 5.26 41.20 5.54 0.89 -0.64 .13 
Competence 
 
47.14 2.73 45.77 4.16 2.78** -2.23 .40 
Gregariousness 
 
40.54 5.69 39.25 6.08 1.52 -1.22 .22 









 Differences Between Applicant and Incumbent Scores on Job Desirability and Social 
Desirability for Sales Job.  
 
      Applicant 
 











































12.01 4.26 11.84 4.03  0.27 -0.23 .04 
Self-Deception 
 
11.46 3.75 10.61 4.09  1.55 -1.61 .22 




 Differences Between Applicant and Incumbent Scores on Job Desirability and Social 
Desirability for Manager Job. 
 
      Applicant 
 











































12.20 4.51 11.02 3.90 1.91 -2.01* .28 
Self-Deception 
 






Proportion of Sales Applicant Fakers Selected Under Varying Selection Ratios Based on 
Top-Down Ranking of Personality Scores. 
 
































.06 .07 .12 .16 .18 
Competence 
 
.06 .08 .09 .11 .11 
Gregariousness 
 
.06 .08 .09 .16 .20 





Proportion of Manager Applicant Fakers Selected Under Varying Selection Ratios Based 
on Top-Down Ranking of Personality Scores. 
 





























.05 .05 .09 .18 .22 
Competence 
 
.05 .10 .12 .13 .13 
Gregariousness 
 
.05 .07 .09 .23 .29 








Within-Subject Differences on Sales versus Manager Job Desirability Scores for 
Applicants. 
 







































Manager 1.94 2.24 2.10 2.19   0.97 110   0.94 -.07 
         
*p < .05.   **p < .01.   ***p < .001.  Note:  N for Sales group = 632.  N for Manager 







Between-Subjects Differences on Sales versus Manager Job Desirability Scores for 
Applicants. 
      




















































        







Mixed-Design Analysis of Variance on Job Desirability Scores for Sales and Manager 





       SS 
 
 
   df 
 
   MS 
 







      1.15 
 
    1 
 
  1.15 
 





    23.04     1 23.04 13.82*** .02 
Job Type X 
Scale Version 
 
    49.40     1 49.40 29.63*** .04 
Subjects 
 









  7.48 
 
  1.67 
  










Pearson’s r Correlations Between Job Desirability and Social Desirability Scale 




















Job Desirability – Manager  111 .30** .35** 
    








Spearman’s Rho Correlations Between Job Desirability and Social Desirability Scale 




















Job Desirability – Manager  111 .21* .33*** 
    







One-Sample Tests on Sales Job Desirability Scores for Sales Incumbents and Applicants. 






















































One-Sample Tests on Manager Job Desirability Scores for Manager Incumbents and 
Applicants. 
























































Parametric and Non-Parametric Correlations Between Job Desirability and Job 

















    .26** 
 
     .26** 
Job Desirability – Manager  111 .07  .02 
    








Item Analysis of Sales Job Desirability Scale - Sales and Manager Applicant Samples. 
    
      Sales      
     Applicants
       Manager        















I have experience with the alpha and 
beta call technique. 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 
 
I have experience sublimating leads. 0.49 0.5 0.38 0.49  
I have transposed a call log. 0.44 0.5 0.33 0.47  
I have experience selling in blue 
markets. 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.32 
 
I have taken Dr. Gerald Peterson’s 
Personal Goal Structure methods 
into account while developing my 
sales goals. 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13 
 
I have experience selling to ordinal 
distributors. 0.20 0.4 0.13 0.33 
 
I have experience selling to bivariate 
customers. 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.35 
 
I have experience doing 
telematrixing sales. 0.22 0.41 0.2 0.4 
 
I have syntaxed quarterly or yearly 
sales profits. 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.46 
 
I have syntonized revenue reports. 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36  
I have conducted a customer 
autogam. 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 
 
I am aware of the American 
Marketing Organization’s 










Item Analysis of Manager Job Desirability Scale - Sales and Manager Applicant 
Samples. 
    
      Sales       
     Applicants
       Manager        















I have used the Critical Affects 
technique for performance 
appraisals. 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.34 
 
I have experience in performance 
deviation. 0.26 0.44 0.38 0.49 
 
I have applied a Managerial Sieve 
strategy to my management 
practices. 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.26 
 
I have experience handling supply 
drifts. 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.41 
 
I have had training in inventory 
covariance control. 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 
 
I have experience with quality 
taxonomy groups. 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 
 
I have used latency planning 
techniques as a manager. 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.31 
 
I have calculated a liquifaction ratio. 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.34  
I know how to calculate Return on 
Exponents (ROE). 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.39 
 
I have proximated vendors as a 
manager. 0.15 0.36 0.28 0.45 
 
I know how to incur cash in-flow. 0.34 0.47 0.41 0.49  
I have read Daniel Goldberg’s book 
entitled The Power of Emotional 























Abrahams, N.  M., Neumann, I., Githens, W.  H.  (1971).  Faking vocational interests: 
Simulated versus real life motivation.  Personnel Psychology, 24, 5-12. 
Alliger, G. M., & Dwight, S. A.  (2000).  A meta-analytic investigation of the 
susceptibility of integrity tests to faking and coaching.  Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 60, 59-72. 
Allport, G.  W.  (1928).  A test for ascendance-submission.  Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 23, 118-136.  
Anderson, C. D., Warner, J.  L., & Spencer, C.  C.  (1984).  Inflation bias in self-
assessment examinations: Implications for valid employee selection.  Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 69, 574-580 
Baer, R.  A., Wetter, M.  W., & Berry, D.  T.  (1992).  Detection of underreporting of 
psychopathology on the MMPI:  A meta-analysis.  Clinical Psychological 
Review, 12, 509-525.   
Barrick, M.  R.  & Mount, M.  K.  (1991).  The big five personality dimensions and job     
performance: A meta-analysis.  Personnel Psychology, 44, 1-26. 
Barrick, M.  R., & Mount, M.  K.  (1996).  Effects of impression management and self-
deception on the predictive validity of personality constructs.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 81, 261-272. 
Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K., & Judge, T. A. (2001).  Personality and performance at the 
beginning of the new millenium:  What do we know and where do we go next?  






Bass, B.  M.  (1957).  Faking by sales applicants of a forced choice personality inventory.  
Journal of Applied Psychology, 41, 403-404. 
Becker, T.  E., & Colquitt, A.  L.  (1992).  Potential versus actual faking of a biodata 
form: An analysis along several dimensions of item type.  Personnel Psychology, 
45, 389-406. 
Bernreuter, R.  G. (1933).  The measurement of self-sufficiency.  Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 28, 291-300. 
Birkeland, S.A., Manson, T.M., Kisamore, J.L., Brannick, M.T., & Smith, M.A. (2006). 
A meta-analytic investigation of job applicant faking on personality measures. 
International Journal of Selection and Management, 14 (4), 317-335. 
Borislow, B.  (1957).  The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) and fakability.   
Journal of Applied Psychology, 42, 22-27. 
Borgatta, E. F.  (1964).  The structure of personality characteristics.  Behavioral Science, 
9, 8-17. 
Bowen, C., Martin, B. A., & Hunt, S.  (2002).  A comparison of ipsative and normative  
approaches for ability to control faking in personality questionnaires.  The 
International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 10, 240-259. 
Bradley, K. M., & Hauenstein, N. M.  (2004, April).  Are personality scale  
correlations inflated in job applicant samples?  Paper presented at the 19th 
Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 
Chicago, IL. 





criterion-related validity estimates:  Sample type and response format.  Paper 
presented at the 19th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL. 
Burkrant, S. R. (2001, April).  Faking personality profiles:  Job-desirability or social 
desirability?  Paper presented at the 16th Annual Conference of the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, San Diego. 
Carroll, S. A., Jones, D. A., & Sulsky, L. M.  (2004, April).  Identifying fakers using a 
bogus item approach.  Interactive poster presented at the 19th Annual Conference 
of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL. 
Cascio, W. F.  (1998).  Applied psychology in human resource management.  (Eds.)  
Upper Saddle River, NJ:  Prentice-Hall.   
Cellar, D.  F., Miller, M.  L., Doverspike, D., Klawsky, J.  D.  (1996).  Comparison of 
Factor Structures and criterion-related validity coefficients for two measures 
based on the five factor model.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 694-704. 
Christiansen, N.  D., Goffin, R.  D., Johnston, N.  G.  & Rothstein, M.  G.  (1994).  
Correcting the 16 pf for faking: Effects on criterion-related validity and individual 
hiring decisions.  Personnel Psychology, 47, 847-860. 
Costa, P.  T., & McCrae, R.  R.  (1992a).  Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-
R) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) professional manual.  Odessa, FL: 
Psychological Assessment Resources. 
Costa, P.  T., & McCrae, R.  R.  (1992b).  Four ways five factors are basic.  Personality 





Costello, R.  M., Schneider, S.  L., & Schoenfeld, L.  S (1993).  Applicant fraud in law 
enforcement.  Psychological Reports, 73, 179-183. 
Crowne, D.  P., & Marlowe, D.  (1964).  A new scale of social desirability independent of 
psychopathology.  Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349-354. 
Dicken, C.  F.  (1959).  Simulated patterns on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 43, 372-378. 
Donovan, J. J., Dwight, S. A., & Hurtz, G. M.  (2003).  An assessment of the prevalence, 
severity, and verifiability of entry-level applicant faking using the Randomized 
Response Technique.  Human Performance, 16, 81-106. 
Douglas, E.  F., McDaniel, M.  A., & Snell, A.  F.  (1996, August).  The validity of non-
cognitive measures decays when applicants fake.  Paper presented at the annual 
conference of the Academy of Management, Cincinnati. 
Drasgow, F., & Hulin, C. L.  (1990).  Item response theory.  In M D. Dunnette & L. M. 
Hough (Eds.), Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (2nd ed., 
Vol. 1, pp. 577-636).  Palo Alto, CA:  Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Dunnette, S., Koun, S., Barber, P.  J.  (1981).  Social desirability in the Eysenck 
Personality Inventory.  British Journal of Psychology, 72, 19-26. 
Dunnette, M.  D., McCartney, J., Carlson, H.  C., & Kirchner, W.  K.  (1962).  A study of 
faking behavior on a forced-choice self-description checklist.  Personnel 
Psychology, 15, 13-24. 
Dwight, S. A., & Donovan, J. J.  (2003).  Do warnings not to fake reduce faking?  Human 





Edwards, A.  L. (1957).  The social desirability variable in personality assessment and 
research.  Ft. Worth, TX:  Dryden Press. 
Ellingson, J.  E., Sackett, P.  R., & Hough, L.  M.  (1999).  Social desirability corrections 
in personality measurement: Issues of applicant comparison and construct 
validity.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 155-166. 
Elliott, A.  G.  P.  (1976).  Fakers: A study of managers’ response on a personality test.  
Personnel Review, 5, 33-37. 
Elliott, A.  G.  P.  (1981).  Some implications of lie scale scores in real-life selection.  
Journal of Occupational Psychology, 54, 9-16. 
Frei, R.  L., Griffith, R.  L., Snell, A.  F., McDaniel, M.  A., & Douglas, E.  F.  (1997, 
April).  Faking of non-cognitive measures: Factor invariance using multiple 
groups LISREL.  Paper presented at the 12th annual conference of the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, St. Louis, MO. 
Furnham, A.  (1986).  Response bias, social desirability and dissimulation.  Personality 
and Individual Differences, 7, 385-400. 
Green, R.  F.  (1951).  Does a selection situation induce testees to bias their answers on 






Griffith, R. L., English, A., Yoshita, Y., Gujar, A., Monnot, M., Malm, T., & Graseck, M.  
(2004, April).  Individual differences and applicant faking behavior:  One of these 
applicants is not like the other.  In N. D. Christiansen (Chair), Beyond Social 
Desirability in Research on Applicant Response Distortion.  Symposium 
conducted at the 19th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL. 
Griffith, R. L., Chmielowski, T. S., Snell, A. F., Frei, R. L., McDaniel, M. A., & Yoshita, 
Y.  (1999, April).  Does faking matter?  An examination of rank order changes in 
applicant data.  Paper presented at the 14th Annual Conference of the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Atlanta, GA. 
Griffith, R.  (1997).  Faking of non-cognitive selection devices: Red herring is hard to 
swallow.  Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio. 
Guion, R. M., & Cranny, C. J.  (1982).  A note on concurrent and predictive validity 
designs:  A critical reanalysis.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 67, 239-244. 
Guiselli, E.E.  (1973).  The validity of aptitude tests in personnel selection.  Personnel 
Psychology, 26, 461-477. 
Harold, C. M., McFarland, L. A., Dudley, N., & Odin, E. P.  Personality and faking 
behavior:  Does warning moderate validity (2004, April)?  In E. D. Heggestad 
(Chair), Effects of Applicant Faking on Validity:  Toward a better understanding.  
Symposium conducted at the 19th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL. 
Harold, C. M., McFarland, L. A., & Weekley, J. A.  (2003, April).  The validity of 





incumbents.  Paper presented at the 18th Annual Conference of the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Orlando, FL. 
Hays, W. L.  (1994).  Statistics (Eds).  Fort Worth, TX:  Harcourt Brace.   
Heron, A.  (1956).  The effects of real-life motivation on questionnaire response.  Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 40, 65-68. 
Hinrichsen, J.  J., Gryll, S.  L., Bradley, L.  A., & Katahn, M.  (1975).  Effects of 
impression management efforts on FIRO-B profiles.  Journal of Consulting & 
Clinical Psychology, 43, 269-275. 
Hogan, J., Barrett, P., & Hogan, R. (2007). Personality measurement, faking, and  
employment selection. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(5), 1270-1285. 
Hogan, R. T., & Hogan, J. C.  (1992).  Manual for the Hogan Personality Inventory.  
Tulsa, OK:  Hogan Assessment Systems. 
Hogan, R. T. (1991).  Personality and personality measurement.  In M.  D.  Dunnette & 
L.  M.  Hough (Eds.) Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 
Vol.  2, (pp. 327-396).  Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
Hogan, R. T., & Nicholson, R.  A.  (1988).  The meaning of personality test scores.  
American Psychologist, 43, 621-626. 
Hogan, R. T., Hogan, J., & Roberts, B.  W.  (1996).  Personality measurement and 
employment decisions: Questions and answers.  American Psychologist, 51, 469-
477. 
Holden, R. R., & Jackson, D.  N.  (1981).  Subtlety, information, and faking effects in 





Hough, L.  M.  (1995, May).  Applicant self descriptions: Evaluating strategies for 
reducing distortion.  In F.  L.  Schmidt (Chair), Response distortion and social 
desirability in personality testing for personnel selection.  Symposium conducted 
at the 10th annual conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, Orlando. 
Hough, L.  M.  (1996, April).  Personality measurement and personnel selection: 
Implementation issues.  In J.  Hogan (Chair), Personality measurement and 
employment decisions: Questions and answers.  Practitioner forum conducted 
11th annual conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, San Diego. 
Hough, L.  M.  (1998a).  Effects of Intentional Distortion in personality measurement and 
evaluation of suggested palliatives.  Human Performance, 11, 209-244. 
Hough, L.  M., & Paulin, C.  (1994).  Construct-oriented scale construction: The rational 
approach.  In G.  S.  Stokes, M.  D., M.  D.  Mumford, & W.  A.  Owens (eds.), 
Biodata Handbook: Theory, research and use of biographical information in 
selection and performance prediction.  Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologist Press. 
Hough, L.  M., Eaton, N.  K., Dunnette, M.  D., Kamp, J.  D., & McCloy, R.  A.  (1990).  
Criterion-related validities of personality constructs and the effect of response 
distortion on those validities [Monograph].  Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 
581-595. 
Hunter, J. E., & Hunter, R. F.  (1984).  Validity and utility of alternative predictors of job 





Hurtz, G. M., & Donovan, J. J.  (2000).  Personality and job performance:  The Big Five 
revisited.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 869-879. 
International Personality Item Pool (2001). A Scientific Collaboratory for the  
Development of Advanced Measures of Personality Traits and Other Individual 
Differences (http://ipip.ori.org/). Internet Web Site. 
James, L. R.  (2000).  Measurement of personality via Conditional Reasoning.  
Organizational Research Methods, 1, 131-163. 
James, L. R.  (1999, April).  Use of Conditional Reasoning to distinguish between 
reliable and unreliable employees.  Paper presented at the 14th Annual Meeting of 
the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Atlanta, GA. 
John, O.  P. & Srivastava, S.  (1999).  In Pervin, L. A. & John, O. P. (eds.), Handbook of 
personality:  Theory and research (pp.  102-138).  New York: Guilford Press. 
Johnson, R.  E., & Chang, C.  (2008).  Relationships between organizational commitment 
and its antecedents:  Employee self-concept matters.  Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 38, 513-541. 
Kelly, E.  L., Miles, C.  C., & Terman, L.  M.  (1936).  Ability to influence on’e score on 
a typical pencil-and-paper test of personality.  Character & Personality:  A 
Quarterly for Psychodiagnostic & Allied Studies, 4, 206-215. 
Kluger, A.  N., & Colella, A.  (1993).  Beyond the mean bias: The effect of warning 
against faking on biodata item variances.  Personnel Psychology, 46, 763-780. 
Kluger, A.  N., Reilly, R.  R., & Russell, C.  J.  (1991).  Faking biodata tests: Are option 





Lautenschlager, G.  J.  (1994).  Accuracy and faking of background data.  In G.  S.  
Stokes, M.  D., M.  D.  Mumford, & W.  A.  Owens (eds.), Biodata Handbook: 
Theory, research and use of biographical information in selection and 
performance prediction (pp.  391-419).  Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologist Press. 
Lautenschlager, G.  J.  (1986).  Within-subject measures for the assessment of individual 
differences in faking.  Educational and Psychological Measurement, 46, 309-316. 
Leasher, M., Miller, C. E., April, T A., Gildea, K. M., Rees, C., Schwartz, D. H., Tristan, 
E. (2004, April). Scenario-Based Formats for Measuring Conscientiousness. 
Paper presented at the 19th annual meeting of the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL. 
 
LeBreton, J. M., Burgess, J. R. D., & James, L. R.  (2000, April).  Measurement issues 
associated with Conditional Reasoning:  Deception and faking. Paper presented at 
the 15th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, New Orleans, LA. 
Longstaff, H.  P.  (1948).  Fakability of the Strong Interest Blank and the Kuder 
Preference Record.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 32, 360-369. 
Mahar, D., Cologon, J., & Duck, J.  (1995).  Response strategies when faking personality 
questionnaires in a vocational selection setting.  Personality and Individual 
Differences, 18, 605-609. 
Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological  
perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299–337. 
Marlowe, D., & Crowne, D. P.  (1961).  Social desirability and response to perceived 





McCrae, R.  R., & Costa, P.  T.  (1983).  Social desirability scales: More substance than 
style.  Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51, 882-888. 
McDaniel, M.  A.  (2004, April).  Discussant. In N. D. Christiansen (Chair), Beyond 
Social Desirability in Research on Applicant Response Distortion.  Symposium 
conducted at the 19th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL. 
McDaniel, M.  A., Douglas, E.  F., & Snell, A.  F.  (1997, April).  A survey of deception 
among job seekers.  Paper presented at the 12th annual conference of the Society 
for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, St. Louis. 
McFarland, L. A., & Ryan, A. M.  (2000).  Variance in faking across noncognitive  
 measures.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 812-821.  
Meehl, P.  E., & Hathaway, S.  R.  (1946).  The K factor as a suppressor variable in the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 30, 
525-564. 
Miller, C. E. (2000).  The Coachability and Fakability of Personality Selection Tests.  
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Akron, OH. 
Miller, C. E., & Barrett, G. V. (2008).  The Coachability and Fakability of Personality-






Miller, C. E., & Tristan, E.  (2002, April).  Expanding the definition of faking beyond 
social desirability:  The case for job desirability.  In L. McFarland (Chair), 
Applicant Faking:  New Perspectives on an Old Issue.  Paper presented at the 17th 
Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 
Toronto. 
Mudgett, B.  (1999, April).  Influence of individual differences and job desirability on 
personality distortion.  Poster session presented at the 17th Annual Conference of 
the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Toronto. 
Mueller-Hanson, R., Heggestad, E. D., & Thornton III, G. C.  (2003).  Faking and 
selection:  Considering the use of personality from select-in and select-out 
perspectives.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 348-355. 
Murphy, K. R., & Myors, B. (1998).  Statistical power analysis.  Mahwah, NJ:  Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Nicholson, R.  A., & Hogan, R.  (1990).  The construct validity of social desirability.  
American Psychologist, 45, 290-291. 
Norman, W.  T. (1963).  Toward an adequate taxonomy of personality attributes:  
Replicated factor structure in peer nomination personality ratings.  Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, 574-583. 
Nunnally, J. C.  (1978).  Psychometric theory.  (Eds.)  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Ones, D.  S., & Viswesvaran, C.  (1998).  The effects of social desirability and faking on 
personality and integrity assessment for personnel selection.  Human 





Ones, D.  S., Viswesvaran, C., & Reiss, A.  D.  (1996).  Role of social desirability in 
personality testing for Personnel Selection: The red herring.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 81, 660-679. 
Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Schmidt, F. L.  (1993).  Comprehensive meta-analysis of 
integrity test validities:  Findings and implications for personnel selection and 
theories of job performance.  Journal of Applied Psychology Monograph, 78, 679-
703. 
Orpen, C.  (1971).  The fakability of the Edwards personal preference schedule in 
personnel selection.  Personnel Psychology, 24, 1-4. 
Pannone, R.  D.  (1984).  Predicting test performance: A content valid approach to 
screening applicants.  Personnel Psychology, 37, 507-514. 
Paulhus, D.  L. (1991a).  Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) reference 
manual for version 6.  (Manual available from author at Department of 
Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C., Canada V6T 
IY7.) 
Paulhus, D.  L.  (1991b).  Measurement and control of response bias.  In J. P. Robinson, 
P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of personality and social 
psychological attitudes (pp.17-59).  San Diego, CA:  Academic Press. 
Paulhus, D.  L.  (1984).  Two-component models of socially desirable responding.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 598-609. 
Piedmont, R.  L., & Weinstein, H.  P.  (1994).  Predicting supervisor ratings of job 






Raymark, P. H., Shilobod, T. L., & Steffensmeier, J.  (2004, April).  An examination of 
job-relevant pattern faking.  Paper presented at the 19th Annual Conference of the 
Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL. 
Reilly, R. R., & Chao, G. R.  (1982).  Validity and fairness of some alternative employee  
 selection procedures.  Personnel Psychology, 35, 1-62.   
Robie, C., Zickar, M. J., & Schmit, M. J.  (2001).  Measurement equivalence between  
applicant and incumbent groups:  An IRT analysis of personality scores.  Human 
Performance, 14, 187-207. 
Rosse, J. G., Stecher, M. D., Miller, J. L., & Levin, R. A. (1998).  The impact of response  
distortion on pre-employment personality testing and hiring decisions.  Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 83, 634-644. 
Ryan, A.  M.  (2002, April).  Discussant.  In L. McFarland (Chair), Applicant Faking:  
New Perspectives on an Old Issue.  Symposium conducted at the 17th Annual 
Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Toronto. 
Ryan, A.  M., Sackett, P.  R.  (1987).  Pre-employment honesty testing: Fakability, 
reactions of test takers, and company image.  Journal of Business and 
Psychology, 1, 248-256. 
Salgado, J. F.  (1997).  The five factor model of personality and job performance in the 
European Community.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 30-43. 
Schmit, M.  J., & Ryan, A.  M., (1993).  The Big Five in personnel selection: Factor 
structure in applicant and nonapplicant populations.  Journal of Applied 





Schmitt, N., Oswald, F. L., Kim, B. H., Gillespie, M. A., Ramsay, L. J., Yoo, T.  (2003).  
Impact of elaboration on socially desirable responding and the validity of biodata 
measures.   Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 979-988. 
Schmitt, N., & Kunce, C.  (2002).  The effects of required elaboration of answers to 
biodata questions.  Personnel Psychology, 55, 569-587. 
Schwab, D.  P., & Packard, G.  L.  (1973).  Response distortion on the Gordon 
Personality Inventory and the Gordon Personal Profile in a selection context: 
Some implications for predicting employee tenure.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 58, 372-374. 
Smith, D.  B., Hanges, P.  J., & Dickson, M.  W.  (2001).  Personnel selection and the 
Five-Factor Model:  Reexamining the effects of applicant’s frame of reference.  
Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 304-315. 
Stanley, S.  A., & Stokes, G.  S.  (1999. April).  Controlling faking with test format: An 
examination.  Poster presented at the 14th annual conference of the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Atlanta. 
Stark, S., Chernyshenko, O.  S., Chan, K., Lee, W.  C., & Drasgow, F.  (2001).  Effects of 
the testing situation on item responding:  Cause for concern.  Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 86, 943-953.   
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1996). Using multivariate statistics (3rd ed.). New 
York: Harper Collins. 
Tett, R.  P., Jackson, D.  N., & Rothstein, M.  (1991).  Personality measures as predictors 





Topping, G. D., & O’Gorman, J. G.  (1997).  Effects of faking set on validity of the 
NEO-FFI.  Personality and Individual Differences, 23, 117-124. 
Tupes, E. C., & Christal, R. C.  (1961).  Recurrent personality factors based on trait 
ratings (Tech. Rep.).  Lackland Air Force base, TX:  USAF. 
Van Iddekinge, C. H., Raymark, P. H., Eidson Jr., C. E., Putka, D. J.  (2003, April).  
Applicant-incumbent differences on personality, integrity, and customer service 
measures.  Paper presented at the 18th Annual Conference of the Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Orlando, FL. 
Velicer, W.  F., & Weiner, B.  J.  (1975).  Effects of sophistication and faking sets on the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory.  Psychological Reports, 37, 71-73. 
Vernon, P.  E.  (1934).  The attitude of the subject in personality testing.  Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 18, 165-177. 
 
Vinchur, A. J., Schippmann, J. S., Switzer III, F. S., & Roth, P. L.  (1998).  A meta-
analytic review of predictors of job performance for salespeople.  Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 83, 586-597. 
Viswesvaran, C., & Ones, D. S.  (1999).  Meta-analyses of fakability estimates:  
Implications for personality measurement.  Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 59, 197-210. 
Wesman, A.  G.  (1952).  Faking personality test scores in a simulated employment 





Worthington, D. L., & Schlottmann, R. S.  (1986).  The predictive validity of subtle and 
obvious empirically derived psychology test items under faking conditions.  
Journal of Personality Assessment, 50, 171-181. 
Zerbe, W. J., & Paulhus, D. L.  (1987).  Socially desirable responding in organizational 
behavior:  A reconception.  Academy of Management Review, 12, 250-264. 
Zickar, M.  J., & Robie, C.  (1999).  Modeling faking good on personality items: An item 
level analysis.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 551-563. 
Zickar, M.  J., Rosse, J., & Levin, R.  (1996, April).  Modeling the effects of faking on  
personality scales.  Paper presented at the 11th annual conference of the Society 







Goldberg’s (1999) IPIP Big-Five Factor Scales 
Directions 
 
In this section, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating scale 
below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you 
generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly 
see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly 
your same age.  Please read each statement carefully, and then select the response that 
best describes you. 
Response Options 
1 = Very Inaccurate  
2 = Moderately Inaccurate 
3 = Neither Inaccurate nor Accurate 
4 = Moderately Accurate 
5 = Very Accurate 
 IPIP Conscientiousness Scale  
 
1. Am always prepared.  
2. Pay attention to details. 
3. Get chores done right away.  
4. Carry out my plans.  
5. Make plans and stick to them.  
6. Waste my time.  
7. Find it difficult to get down to work.  
8. Do just enough work to get by.  
9. Don't see things through.  


































IPIP Gregariousness (analogue to Hogan’s Sales Potential) Scale 
 
1. Don't mind being the center of attention. 
2. Feel comfortable around people. 
3. Talk to a lot of different people at parties. 
4. Am the life of the party. 
5. Know how to captivate people. 
6. Don't like to draw attention to myself. 
7. Have little to say. 
8. Dislike being the center of attention. 
9. Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. 
10. Keep in the background. 
1. Feel comfortable around people. 
2. Make friends easily.  
3. Am skilled in handling social situations. 
4. Am the life of the party.  
5. Know how to captivate people.  
6. Have little to say.  
7. Keep in the background.  
8. Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull.  
9. Don't like to draw attention to myself.  
10. Don't talk a lot. 
1. Come up with good solutions.  
2. Complete tasks successfully. 
3. Carry out my plans. 
4. Accomplish a lot of work. 
5. Get things done quickly. 
6. Feel that my life lacks direction. 
7. Am not sure where my life is going. 
8. Hang around doing nothing. 
9. Do just enough work to get by. 







Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991) 
 
Directions 
Use the rating scale below as a guide for the next set of questions.  On a scale of 1 to 7, 
with 1 = “Not True” and 7 = “Very True,” indicate how much you agree with the 




Impression Management Subscale 
 
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
2. I never cover up my mistakes. 
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of people. 
4. I never swear. 
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
6. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
7. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
8. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
9. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
10. I always declare everything at customs. 
11. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
12. I have never dropped litter on the street. 
13. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
14. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
15. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
16. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
17. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick. 
18. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
19. I have some pretty awful habits. 





1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
4. I have not always been honest with myself. 
5. I always know why I like things. 





7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
11. I never regret my decisions. 
12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
15. I am a completely rational person. 
16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
17. I am very confident of my judgments. 
18. I have sometimes doubted my intelligence. 
19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 








Job Desirability Scales 
 
Job Desirability Scale: Sales Version 
1. I have experience with the alpha and beta call technique. 
2. I have experience sublimating leads. 
3. I have transposed a call log. 
4. I have experience selling in blue markets. 
5. I have taken Dr. Gerald Peterson’s Personal Goal Structure methods into account 
while developing my sales goals. 
6. I have experience selling to ordinal distributors. 
7. I have experience selling to bivariate customers. 
8. I have experience doing telematrixing sales. 
9. I have syntaxed quarterly or yearly sales profits. 
10. I have syntonized revenue reports. 
11. I have conducted a customer autogam. 




Sales Version Distracter Items 
1. I have experience making cold calls. 
2. I have experience qualifying prospects. 
3. I have experience obtaining re-sales, or repeat sales. 
4. I have experience obtaining customer referrals. 
5. I have experience with system sales. 
6. I have created projected sales reports. 
7. I have calculated Return on Investment (ROI). 










Job Desirability Scale: Manager Version 
1. I have used the Critical Affects technique for performance appraisals. 
2. I have experience in performance deviation. 
3. I have applied a Managerial Sieve strategy to my management practices. 
4. I have experience handling supply drifts. 
5. I have had training in inventory covariance control. 
6. I have experience with quality taxonomy groups. 
7. I have used latency planning techniques as a manager. 
8. I have calculated a liquifaction ratio. 
9. I know how to calculate Return on Exponents (ROE). 
10. I have proximated vendors as a manager. 
11. I know how to incur cash in-flow. 
12. I have read Daniel Goldberg’s book entitled The Power of Emotional Leadership. 
 
Manager Version Distracter Items 
1. I have experience implementing Management By Objectives (MBO) principles. 
2. I have experience implementing Total Quality Management (TQM) principles. 
3. I have had training in Management Information Systems (MIS). 
4. I have experience with supply chain management. 
5. I have had training in ISO9000 Certification procedures. 
6. I have assessed fixed and variable costs. 
7. I know how to calculate Return on Total Assets (ROTA). 













Instructions for Primary Consulting Firm 
Note:  Since most business functions include some customer contact, the questions in the 
Sales Orientation Assessment are required for all positions. If you have never had direct 
sales experience, answer the questions according to how you believe they would apply if 
you were in sales. Note: a "No Opinion" response is acceptable and will not substantially 
affect your results. 
Instructions: Be sure to answer every required question. If you skip any required 
questions, you will be prompted to complete them before you can go on to the next 
section.  
• If you change your mind about an answer, scroll back up on the page and 
change your answer. Do this before you click on the "Click Here to Continue" 
button at the bottom of each page, because you won't be able to come back to that 
page of questions.  
• If you have to stop before you have completed the assessment, don't worry:  
when you log back in to resume it will return you to where you need to continue. 
However, if you have finished a page of questions, those answers cannot be 
saved until you click on the button at the bottom of the page, and the 
following page of questions appears. If your browser times out before the next 
page appears (it will say "The page cannot be found", or something similar), 
refresh the screen using the Refresh and Retry commands if you are using 
Microsoft Internet Explorer as your browser. If you are using Netscape, use the 
Reload and OK commands.  
• Give yourself every advantage: Your best bet is to be as honest as possible, and 
give your first-impulse answer. This survey is not timed, but please answer the 
statements as quickly as possible for the most accurate results. There are no 
"right" or "wrong" answers.  
• Caution:  Don't make the mistake of trying to out-think the questions and make 
yourself appear different from what is really true. There are validity scales built 
into this assessment.  
• [Consulting firm’s name] do not report individual answers. Only a 






Instructions for Secondary Consulting Firm 
 
Dear [FirstName] [LastName], 
 
Congratulations, you have been chosen to complete the SalesPro assessment. This assessment asks you to answer 
questions about yourself how you approach your sales job. The information collected will be used by your organization 
to better understand their salesforce and to help make better hiring decisions.  
 
Please complete this assessment at your earliest convenience. We appreciate you taking the time participate in this 
assessment process and help your organization to improve and succeed. 
 
The assessment will take approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete. We suggest that you take the assessment in a 
quiet place where you can focus and concentrate. Please be honest in your responses. The more honest and accurate 
participants are when taking the assessment, the more accurate the results will be. 
 
Before completing the assessment, please make sure that you have a high speed internet connection (e.g., Cable, DSL, 
T1).  The assessment may not be able to run on a dial up connection. 
To complete the assessment, click on the following link (link): 
 
 
If there is no response when clicking the link above, please copy and paste the link into your browser and try again.  
Then, follow these steps: 
 
1. Log in by entering your email address (work email) and clicking “Continue” 
2. Click on the link with your position title (HM Insurance: Consultant or Director) 
3. Click on the “Launch Assessment” button and the assessment will soon begin 
 
NOTE:  if nothing happens after clicking “Launch Assessment”, you likely have a pop-up blocker still activated.  A 
quick shortcut to bypass pop up blockers is to hold down the CONTROL key while you 
click on the “Launch Assessment” button, and continue holding the Control key for 2-3 seconds.  This 
usually bypasses any blockers you may have turned on (e.g., Yahoo or Google task bars have their own pop up 
blockers). 
 
To successfully view and complete the assessment, certain technical parameters must be met. If the assessment does 
not load after clicking the Launch Assessment button, please close all windows and re-enter the assessment.  Please be 




1. Windows 98/NT/2000/XP 
2. Mouse 
3. Monitor screen resolution set to 800x600 with color quality set to high color (thousands of colors) or better 4. 
High-speed Internet Access (DSL connection acceptable; T1 or better is ideal) 
4. Internet browser pop-up blockers need to be disabled (you can also hold Control key while launching 
assessment) 
5. Internet Explorer 6 or higher 
6. Flash Player Plug-in 7.0.19.0 or higher 
 
If you continue to experience technical difficulties, please contact your organization’s HR representative. 
 
Thank you. 
